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Abstract
By introducing programmability, automated verification, and innovative debugging tools,
Software-Defined Networks (SDNs) are poised to meet the increasingly stringent dependability
requirements of today’s communication networks. However, the design of fault-tolerant SDNs
remains an open challenge.
This paper considers the design of dependable SDNs through the lenses of self-stabilization—
a very strong notion of fault-tolerance. In particular, we develop algorithms for an in-band and
distributed control plane for SDNs, called Renaissance, which tolerate a wide range of (concur-
rent) controller, link, and communication failures. Our self-stabilizing algorithms ensure that
after the occurrence of an arbitrary combination of failures, (i) every non-faulty SDN controller
can reach any switch (or another controller) in the network within a bounded communication
delay (in the presence of a bounded number of concurrent failures) and (ii) every switch is
managed by at least one controller (as long as at least one controller is not faulty).
We evaluate Renaissance through a rigorous worst-case analysis as well as a prototype im-
plementation (based on OVS and Floodlight), and we report on our experiments using Mininet.
1 Introduction
Context and Motivation. Software-Defined Network (SDN) technologies have emerged as a
promising alternative to the vendor-specific, complex, and hence error-prone, operation of tradi-
tional communication networks. In particular, by outsourcing and consolidating the control over
the data plane elements to a logically centralized software, SDNs support a programmatic veri-
fication and enable new debugging tools. Furthermore, the decoupling of the control plane from
the data plane, allows the former to evolve independently of the constraints of the latter, enabling
faster innovations.
However, while the literature articulates well the benefits of the separation between control and
data plane and the need for distributing the control plane (e.g., for performance and fault-tolerance),
the question of how connectivity between these two planes is maintained (i.e., the communication
channels from controllers to switches and between controllers) has not received much attention.
Providing such connectivity is critical for ensuring the availability and robustness of SDNs.
Guaranteeing that each switch is managed, at any time, by at least one controller is challenging
especially if control is in-band, i.e., if control and data traffic is forwarded along the same links and
devices and hence arrives at the same ports. In-band control is desirable as it avoids the need to
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build, operate, and ensure the reliability of a separate out-of-band management network. Moreover,
in-band management can in principle improve the resiliency of a network, by leveraging a higher
path diversity (beyond connectivity to the management port).
The goal of this paper is the design of a highly fault-tolerant distributed and in-band con-
trol plane for SDNs. In particular, we aim to develop a self-stabilizing software-defined network:
An SDN that recovers from controller, switch, and link failures, as well as a wide range of com-
munication failures (such as packet omissions, duplications, or reorderings). As such, our work
is inspired by Radia Perlman’s pioneering work [38]: Perlman’s work envisioned a self-stabilizing
Internet and enabled today’s link state routing protocols to be robust, scalable, and easy to man-
age. Perlman also showed how to modify the ARPANET routing broadcast scheme, so that it
becomes self-stabilizing [39], and provided a self-stabilizing spanning tree algorithm for intercon-
necting bridges [40]. Yet, while the Internet core is “conceptually self-stabilizing”, Perlman’s vision
remains an open challenge, especially when it comes to recent developments in computer networks,
such as SDNs, for which we propose self-stabilizing algorithms.
Fault Model. We consider (i) fail-stop failures of controllers, which failure detectors can observe,
(ii) link failures, and (iii) communication failures, such as packet omission, duplication, and re-
ordering. In particular, our fault model includes up to κ link failures, for some parameter κ ∈ Z+.
In addition, to the failures captured in our model, we also aim to recover from transient faults, i.e.,
any temporary violation of assumptions according to which the system and network were designed
to behave, e.g., the corruption of the packet forwarding rules changes to the availability of links,
switches, and controllers. We assume that (an arbitrary combination of) these transient faults can
corrupt the system state in unpredictable manners. In particular, when modeling the system, we
assume that these violations bring the system to an arbitrary state (while keeping the program code
intact). Starting from an arbitrary state, the correctness proof of self-stabilizing systems [20, 18]
has to demonstrate the return to correct behavior within a bounded period, which brings the system
to a legitimate state.
The Problem. This paper answers the following question: How can all non-faulty controllers
maintain bounded (in-band) communication delays to any switch as well as to any other controller?
We interpret the requirements for provable (in-band) bounded communication delays to imply
(i) the absence of out-of-band communications or any kind of external support, and yet (ii) the
possibility of fail-stop failures of controllers and link failures, as well as (iii) the need for guaranteed
bounded recovery time after the occurrence of arbitrary transient faults. These faults are transient
violations of the assumptions according to which the system was designed to behave.
Our Contributions. We present an important module for dependable networked systems: a
self-stabilizing software-defined network. In particular, we provide a (distributed) self-stabilizing
algorithm for distributed SDN control planes that, relying solely on in-band communications, re-
cover (from a wide spectrum of controller, link, and communication failures as well as transient
faults) by re-establishing connectivity in a robust manner. Concretely, we present a system, hence-
forth called Renaissance1, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to provide:
1. A robust efficient and distributed control plane: We maintain short, O(D)-length control
plane paths in the presence of controller and link (at most κ many) failures, as well as,
1The word renaissance means ‘rebirth’ (French) and it symbolizes the ability of the proposed system to recover
after the occurrence of transient faults that corrupt the system state.
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communication failures, where D ≤ N is the (largest) network diameter (when considering
any possible network topology changes over time) and N is the number of nodes in the
network. More specifically, suppose that throughout the recovery period the network topology
was (κ + 1)-edge-connected and included at least one (non-failed) controller. We prove that
starting from a legitimate state, i.e., after recovery, our self-stabilizing solution can:
• Deal with fail-stop failures of controllers: These failures require the removal of stale
information (that is related to unreachable controllers) from the switch configurations.
Cleaning up stale information avoids inconsistencies and having to store large amounts
of history data.
• Deal with link failures: Starting from a legitimate system state, the controllers maintain
an O(D)-length path to all nodes (including switches and other controllers), as long as
at most κ links fail. That is, after the recovery period the communication delays are
bounded.
2. Recovery from transient faults: We show that our control plane can even recover after the
occurrence of transient faults. That is, starting from an arbitrary state, the system recovers
within time O(D2N) to a legitimate state. In a legitimate state, the number of packet
forwarding rules per switch is at most |PC | times the optimal, where |PC | is the number
of controllers. The proposed algorithm is memory adaptive [4], i.e., after the recovery from
transient faults, each node’s use of local memory depends on the actual number, nC , of
controllers in the system, rather than the upper bound, NC , on the number of controllers in
the system.
3. The proposed algorithm is memory adaptive. That is, after its recovery from transient faults,
each node’s use of local memory depends on the actual number of controllers in the system,
nC , rather than the upper bound on the number of controllers in the system, NC . We present
a non-memory adaptive variation on the proposed algorithm that recovers within a period of
Θ(D) after the occurrence of transient faults. This is indeed faster than the O(D2N) recovery
time of the proposed algorithm. However, the cost of memory use after stabilization can be
NC/nC times higher than the proposed algorithm. Moreover, the fact that the recovery time
of the proposed memory adaptive solution is longer is relevant only in the presence of rare
faults that can corrupt the system state arbitrarily, because for the case of benign failures,
we demonstrate recovery within Θ(D).
While we are not the first to consider the design of self-stabilizing systems which maintain
redundant paths also beyond transient faults, the challenge and novelty of our approach comes
from the specific restrictions imposed by SDNs (and in particular the switches). In this setting
not all nodes can compute and communicate, and in particular, SDN switches can merely forward
packets according to the rules that are decided by other nodes, the controllers. This not only
changes the model, but also requires different proof techniques, e.g., regarding the number of resets
and illegitimate rule deletions.
In order to validate and evaluate our model and algorithms, we implemented a prototype of
Renaissance in Floodlight using Open vSwitch (OVS), complementing our worst-case analysis. Our
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Figure 1: The system architecture, which is based on self-stabilizing versions of existing network layers. The
external building blocks for rule generation and local topology discovery appear in the dotted boxes. The proposed
contribution of self-stabilizing SDN controller and self-stabilizing abstract switch appear in bold.
experiments in Mininet demonstrate the feasibility of our approach, indicating that in-band control
can be bootstrapped and maintained efficiently and automatically, also in the presence of failures.
To ensure reproducibility and to facilitate research on improved and alternative algorithms, we
have released the source code and evaluation data to the community at [52].
We also discuss relevant extensions to the proposed solution (Section 8.2), such as a combing
both in-band and out-of-band communications, as well as coordinating the actions of the different
controllers using a reconfigurable replicated state machine.
Organization. We give an overview of our system and the components it interfaces in Section 2
and introduce our formal model in Section 3. Our algorithm is presented in Section 4, analyzed in
Section 5, and validated in Section 6. We then discuss related work (Section 7) before drawing the
conclusions from our study (Section 8).
2 The System in a Nutshell
Our self-stabilizing SDN control plane can be seen as one critical piece of a larger architecture for
providing fault-tolerant communications. Indeed, a self-stabilizing SDN control plane can be used
together with existing self-stabilizing protocols on other layers of the OSI stack, e.g., self-stabilizing
link layer and self-stabilizing transmission control protocols [25, 21], which provide logical FIFO
communication channels. To put things into perspective, we provide a short overview of the overall
network architecture we envision. Our proposal includes new self-stabilizing components that
leverage existing self-stabilizing protocols towards an overall network architecture that is more
robust than existing SDNs. We consider an architecture (Figure 1) that comprises mechanisms for
local topology discovery and a logic for packet forwarding rule generation. We contribute to this
architecture a self-stabilizing abstract switch as well as a self-stabilizing SDN control platform.
The network includes a set PC = {p1, . . . , pnC} of nC (remote) controllers, and a set PS =
{pnC+1, . . . , pnC+nS} of the nS (packet forwarding) switches, where i is the unique identifier of node
pi ∈ P = PC ∪ PS . We denote by Nc(i) ⊆ P (communication neighborhood) the set of nodes
which are directly connecting node pi ∈ P and node pj , i.e., pj ∈ Nc(i). At any given time,
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and for any given node pi ∈ P , the set No(i) (operational neighborhood) refers to pi’s directly
connected nodes for which ports are currently available for packet forwarding. The local topology
information in No(i) is liable to change rapidly and without notice. We denote the operational
and connected communication topology as Go = (P,Eo), and respectively, as Gc = (P,Ec), where
Ex = {(pi, pj) ∈ P × P : pj ∈ Nx(i)} for x ∈ {o, c}.
Each switch pi ∈ PS stores a set of rules that the controllers install in order to define which
packets have to be forwarded to which ports. In the out-of-band control scenario, a controller
communicates the forwarding rules via a dedicated management port to the control module of the
switch. In contrast, in an in-band setting, the control traffic is interleaved with the data plane
traffic, which is the traffic between hosts (as opposed to controller-to-controller and controller-to-
switch traffic): switches can be connected to hosts through data ports and may have additional
rules installed in order to correctly forward their traffic. We do not assume anything about the
hosts’ network service, except for that their traffic may traverse any network link.
In an in-band setting, control and data plane traffic arrive through the same ports at the switch,
which implies a need for being able to demultiplex control and data plane traffic: switches need
to know whether to forward (data) traffic out of another port or (control) traffic to the control
module. In other words, control plane packets need to be logically distinguished from data plane
traffic by some tag (or another deterministic discriminator).
Figure 2 illustrates the switch model considered in this paper. Our self-stabilizing control
plane considers a proposal for abstract switches that do not require the extensive functionality that
existing SDN switches provide. An abstract switch can be managed either via the management
port or in-band. It stores forwarding (match-action) rules. These rules are used to forward data
plane packets to ports leading to neighboring switches, or to forward control packets to the local
control module (e.g., instructing the control module to change existing rules). Rules can also drop
all the matched packets. The match part of a rule can either be an exact match or optionally
include wildcards.
Maintaining the forwarding rules with in-band control is the key challenge addressed in this
paper: for example, these rules must ensure (in a self-stabilizing manner) that control and data
packets are demultiplexed correctly (e.g., using tagging). Moreover, it must be ensured that we
do not end up with a set of misconfigured forwarding rules that drop all arriving (data plane and
control plane) packets: in this case, a controller will never be able to manage the switch anymore
in the future.
In the following, we will assume a local topology discovery mechanism that each node uses
to report to the controllers the availability of their direct neighbors. Also, we assume access to
self-stabilizing protocols for the link layer (and the transport layer) [25, 21] that provide reliable,
bidirectional FIFO-communication channels over unreliable media that is prone to packet omission,
reordering, and duplication.
2.1 Switches and rules
Each switch pi ∈ PS stores a set of forwarding rules which are installed by the controllers (servers)
and define which packets have to be forwarded to which ports. In an out-of-band network, a
controller communicates the forwarding rules via a dedicated management port to the control
module of the switch. In contrast, in an in-band setting, the control traffic is interleaved with the
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Figure 2: Abstract SDN switch illustration.
dataplane traffic, and is communicated (possibly along multiple hops, in case of a remote controller)
to a regular switch port. This implies that in-band control requires the switch to demultiplex control
and data plane traffic. In other words, the dataplane of a switch cannot only be used to connect
the switch ports internally, but also to connect to the control module.
In this paper, we make the natural assumption that switches have a bounded amount of mem-
ory. Moreover, we assume that rules come in the form of match-action pairs, where the match
can optionally include wildcards and the action part mainly defines a forwarding operation (cf.
Figure 2).
More formally, suppose that pi ∈ PS is a switch that receives a packet with psrc ∈ PC and
pdest ∈ P , as the packet source and destination, respectively. We refer to a rule (for packet
forwarding at the switch) by a tuple 〈k, i, src, dest, prt, j,metadata〉. The fields of a rule refer to
pk as the controller that created this rule, prt ∈ {0, . . . , nprt} : nprt ≥ κ + 1 is a priority that pk
assigns to this rule, pj ∈ Nc(i) is a port on which the packet can be sent whenever pj ∈ No(i),
and metadata is an (optional) opaque data value. Our self-stabilizing abstract switch considers
only rules that are installed on the switches indefinitely, i.e., until a controller explicitly requests
to delete them, rather than setting up rules with expiration timeouts.
We say that the rule r = 〈k, i, src, dest, prt, j, metadata〉 is applicable for a packet that
reaches switch pi and has source psrc and destination pdest, when r is the rule with the highest
prt (priority) that matches the packet’s source and destination fields, and pj ∈ No(i), i.e., the link
(pi, pj) is operational. We say that the set of rules of switch pi, rules(i), is unambiguous, if for
every received packet there is at most one applicable rule. Thus, a packet can be forwarded if there
exists only one applicable rule in the switch’s memory. We assume an interface function myRules()
which outputs the unambiguous rules that a controller pk ∈ PC needs to install to a switch pj ∈ PS ,
based on pk’s knowledge of the network’s topology. We require rules to be unambiguous and offer
6
resilience against at most κ link failures (details appear in Section 2.2.2).
2.1.1 The abstract switch
The main task of switches is to forward traffic according to the rules installed by the controllers.
In addition, switches provide basic functionalities for interacting with the controllers.
While OpenFlow, the de facto standard specification for the switch interface, as well as other
suggestions (Forwarding Metamorphosis [12], P4 [11], and SNAP [5]) provide innovative abstrac-
tions with respect to data plane functionality and means to implement efficient network services,
there is less work regarding the control plane abstraction, especially with respect to fault tolerance.
We consider a slightly simpler switch model that does not include all the functionality one may
find in an existing SDN switch. In particular, the proposed abstract SDN switch only supports the
equal roles approach (where multiple “equal” controllers manage the switch); the master-slave setup
usually used by switches [34] is not relevant toward the design of our self-stabilizing distributed
SDN control plane. We elaborate more on the interface in the following.
Configuration queries (via a direct neighbor)
As long as the system rules and operational links support (bidirectional) packet forwarding between
controller pi and switch pj , the abstract switch allows pi to access pj ’s configuration remotely, i.e.,
via the interface functions manager(j) (query and update), rules(j) (query and update) as well as
Nc(j) (query-only), where manager(j) ⊆ PC is pj ’s set of assigned managers and rules(j) is pj ’s
rule set. Also, a switch pj , upon arrival of a query of a controller pi, responds to pi with the tuple
〈j,Nc(j),manager(j), rules(j)〉.
The abstract switch also allows controller pi to query node pj via pj ’s direct neighbor, pk as long
as pi knows pk’s local topology. In case pj is a switch, pi can also modify pj ’s configuration (via
pj ’s abstract switch) to include a flow to pi (via pk) and then to add itself as a manager of pj . (The
term flow refer here to rules installs on a path in the network in a way that allows packet exchange
between the path ends.) We refer to this as the query (and modify)-by-neighbor functionality.
The switch memory management
The number of rules and controllers (that manage switches) that each switch can store is bounded
by maxRules and maxManagers, respectively. The abstract switch has a way to deal with clogged
memory by storing the rules and managers in a FIFO manner (say, using local counters that serve as
timestamps in the meta-information (metadata) part of each rule). Whenever a controller accesses
a switch, that switch refreshes these timestamps, i.e., all switch configuration items related to this
controller. When the switch memory has more than maxRules rules, the switch removes the rule
that has the earliest timestamp so that a new rule can be added. This mechanism prioritizes
newer rules (and manager information) that controllers install. Note that, as long as a switch has
sufficient memory to store the rules of all controllers in PC , the above mechanism does not need
to remove any rule of controller pi ∈ PC after the first time that pi has refreshed its rules on that
switch. Similarly, we assume that whenever the number of managers that a switch stores exceeds
maxManagers, the last to be stored (or access) manager is removed so that a new manager can
be added.
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2.2 Building blocks
Our architecture relies on a fault-tolerant mechanism for topology discovery. We use such a mech-
anism as an external building block. Moreover, we require a notion of resilient flows. We next
discuss both these aspects.
2.2.1 Topology discovery
We assume a mechanism for local neighborhood discovery. We consider a system that uses an (ever
running) failure detection mechanism, such as the self-stabilizing Θ failure detector [8, Section
6]: it discovers the switch neighborhood by identifying the failed/non-failed status of its attached
links and neighbors. We assume that this mechanism reports the set of nodes which are directly
connecting node pi ∈ P and node pj , i.e., pj ∈ Nc(i).
2.2.2 Fault-resilient flows
We consider fault-resilient flows that are reminiscent of the flows in [33]. The definition of κ-fault-
resilient flows considers the network topology Gc and assumes that Gc is not subject to changes.
The idea is that the network can forward the data packets along the shortest routes, and use
alternative routes in the presence of link failures, based on conditional forwarding rules [9]; these
failover rules provide a backup for every edge and an enhancement of this redundancy for the case
in which at most κ links fail, as we describe next.
Let (pr1 , . . . , prn) ∈ Pn be a directed path in the communication network Gc, where n ∈
{2, . . . , |P |}. Given an operational network Go, we say that (pr1 , . . . , prn) is a flow (over a simple
path) in Go, when the rules stored in pr1 , . . . , prn relay packets from source pr1 to destination prn
using the switches in the sequence pr2 , . . . , prn−1 for packet forwarding (relay nodes). Let Go(k) be
an operational network that is obtained from Gc by an arbitrary removal of k links. We say there
is a κ-fault-resilient flow from pi to pj in Gc when for any k ≤ κ there is a flow (over a simple path)
from pi to pj in any Go(k). We note that when considering a communication graph, Gc, with a
general topology, the construction of κ-fault-resilient flows is possible when κ < λ(Gc), where λ(Gc)
is the edge-connectivity of Gc (i.e., the minimum number of edges whose removal can disconnect
Gc).
3 Models
This section presents a formal model of the studied system (Figure 1), which serves as the framework
for our correctness analysis of the proposed self-stabilizing algorithms (Section 5).
We model the control plane as a message passing system that has no notion of clocks (nor
explicit timeout mechanisms), however, it has access to link failure detectors (in a way that is
similar to the Paxos model [8, 32]). We borrow from [8, Section 6] a technique for local link
monitoring (Section 2.2.1), which assumes that every abstract switch can complete at least one
round-trip communication with any of its direct neighbors while it completes at most Θ round-
trips with any other directly connected neighbor. In other words, in our analytical model, but
not in our emulation-base evaluation, we assume that nodes have a mechanism to locally detect
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temporary link failures (e.g., a link may also be unavailable due to congestion); a link which is
unavailable for a longer time period will be flagged as permanent failure by a failure detector,
which we borrow from [8, Section 6]. Apart from this monitoring of link status, we consider the
control plane as an asynchronous system. Note that once the system installs a κ-fault-resilient flow
between controller pi ∈ Pc and node pj ∈ P \ {pi}, the network provides a communication channel
between pi and pj that has a bounded delay (because we assume that there are never more than κ
link failures). Moreover, these bounded delays are offered by the data plane while the control plane
is still asynchronous as described above (since, for example, we assume no bound on the time it
takes a controller to perform a local computation).
Self-stabilizing algorithms usually consist of a do forever loop that contains communication
operations and validations that the system is in a consistent state as part of the transition decision.
An iteration (of the do forever loop) is said to be complete if it starts in the loop’s first line
and ends at the last (regardless of whether it enters branches). As long as every non-failed node
eventually completes its do forever loop, the proposed algorithm is oblivious to the rate in which
this completion occurs. Moreover, the exact time considerations can be added later for the sake of
fine-tuning performances.
3.1 The communication channel model
We are given reliable end-to-end FIFO channels over capacitated links, as implemented, e.g.,
by [25, 21], which guarantee reliable message transfer regardless of packet omission, duplication,
and reordering. After the recovery period of the channel algorithm [25, 21], it holds that, at any
time, there is exactly one token pkt ∈ {act, ack} in the channel that is either in transit from the
sender pi ∈ P to the receiver pj ∈ P , i.e., channeli,j = {act} ∧ channelj,i = ∅, or the token pkt is
in transit from pj to pi, i.e., channeli,j = ∅∧ channelj,i = {ack}. During the recovery period (after
the last occurrence of a transient fault), it can be the case that the sender sends a message m0 for
which it receives a (false) acknowledgment ack0 without having m0 go through a complete round-
trip. However, that can occur at most ∆comm times, where ∆comm ≤ 3 for the case of [25, 21].
That is, once the sender sends message m1 and receives its acknowledgment ack1, the channel
algorithm [25, 21] guarantees that m1 has completed a round-trip.
When node pi sends a packet, pkt ∈ {act, ack}, to node pj , the operation send inserts a copy
of pkt to the FIFO queue that represents the above communication channel from pi to pj , while
respecting the above token circulation constraint. When pj receives pkt from pi, node pj delivers
pkt from the channel’s queue and transfers pkt’s acknowledgment to the channel from pj to pi
immediately after.
3.2 The execution model
For our analysis, we consider the standard interleaving model [20], in which there is a single (atomic)
step at any given time. An input event can be either a packet reception or a periodic timer triggering
pi to resend while executing the do forever loop. In our settings, the timer rate is completely
unknown and the only assumption that we make is that every non-failing node executes its do
forever loop infinitely often.
We model a node (switch or controller) using a state machine that executes its program by
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taking a sequence of (atomic) steps, where a step of a controller starts with local computations
and ends with a single communication operation: either send or receive of a packet. A step of
the (control module of an) abstract switch starts with a single message reception, continues with
internal processing and ends with a single message send.
The state of node pi, denoted by si, consists of the values of all the variables of the node
including its communication channels. The term (system) state is used for a tuple of the form
(s1, s2, · · · , sn, Go), where each si is the state of node pi (including messages in transit to pi) and
Go is the operational network that is determined by the environment. We define an execution
(or run) R = c0, a0, c1, a1, . . . as an alternating sequence of system states cx and steps ax, such
that each state cx+1, except the initial system state c0, is obtained from the preceding state cx by
applying step ax.
For the sake of simple presentation of the correctness proof, we assume that the abstract switch
deals with one controller at a time, e.g., when requesting a configuration update or a query. More-
over, we assume that within a single atomic step, the abstract switch can receive the controller
request, perform the update, and send a reply to the controller.
3.3 The network model
We consider a system in which maxRules is large enough to store all the rules that all controllers
need to install to any given switch, and that maxManagers ≥ NC . We assume that |PC | = nC and
|PS | = nS are known only by their upper bounds, i.e., NC ≥ |PC |, and respectively, NS ≥ |PS |. We
use these bounds only for estimating the memory requirements per node, in terms of maxRules
and maxManagers, i.e., the maximum number of rules, and respectively, managers at any switch.
Suppose that a κ-fault-resilient flow from pi to pj is installed in the network. The term primary
path refers to the path along which the network forwards packets from pi to pj in the absence of
failures. We assume that myRules() returns rules that encode κ-fault-resilient flows for a given
network topology. The primary paths encoded by myRules() are also the shortest paths in Gc (with
the highest rule priority). A rule in myRules() corresponding to k link failures (k-fault-resilient
flow) has the (k + 1)-highest rule priority.
3.3.1 Communication fairness
Due to the presence of faults in the system, we do not consider any bound on the communication
delay, which could be, for example, the result of the absence of properly installed flows between
the sender and the receiver. Nevertheless, when a flow is properly installed, the channel is not
disconnected and thus we assume that sending a packet infinitely often implies its reception infinitely
often. We refer to the latter assumption as the communication fairness property. We make the
same assumptions both for the link and transport layers.
3.3.2 Message round-trips and iterations of self-stabilizing algorithms
This work proposes a solution for bootstrapping in-band communication in SDNs. The correctness
proof depends on the nodes’ ability to exchange messages during this bootstrapping. The proof
uses the notion of a message round-trip, which includes sending a message to a node and receiving
a reply from that node. Note that this process spans over many system states.
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We give a detailed definition of round-trips as follows. Let pi ∈ PC be a controller and pj ∈
P \ {pi} be a network node. Suppose that immediately after state c node pi sends a message m
to pj , for which pi awaits a response. At state c
′, that follows state c, node pj receives message m
and sends a response message rm to pi. Then, at state c
′′, that follows state c′, node pi receives
pj ’s response, rm. In this case, we say that pi has completed with pj a round-trip of message m.
We define an iteration of a self-stabilizing algorithm in our model. Let Pi be the set of nodes with
whom pi completes a message round trip infinitely often in execution R. Suppose that immediately
after the state cbegin, controller pi takes a step that includes the execution of the first line of the
do forever loop, and immediately after system state cend, it holds that: (i) pi has completed the
iteration it has started immediately after cbegin (regardless of whether it enters branches) and (ii)
every message m that pi has sent to any node pj ∈ Pi during the iteration (that has started
immediately after cbegin) has completed its round trip. In this case, we say that pi’s iteration (with
round-trips) starts at cbegin and ends at cend.
3.4 The fault model
We characterize faults by their duration, that is, they are either transient or permanent. We
consider the occurrence frequency of transient faults to be either rare or not rare. We illustrate our
fault model in Figure 3.
3.4.1 Failures that are not rare
Transient packet failures, such as omissions, duplications, and reordering, may occur often. Recall
that we assume communication fairness and the use of a self-stabilizing link layer (and transport
layer) [25, 21]. This protocol assures that the system’s unreliable media, which are prone to
packet omission, reordering, and duplication, can be used for providing reliable, bidirectional FIFO-
communication channels without omissions, duplications or reordering. Note that the assumption
that the communication is fair may still imply that there are periods in which a link is temporarily
unavailable. We assume that at any time there are no more than such κ link failures.
3.4.2 Failures that may occur rarely
We model rare faults to occur only before the system starts running. That is, during the system
run, Gc does not change and it is (κ+ 1)-edge connected.
A permanent link failure or addition results in the removal, and respectively, the inclusion of
that link from the network. The fail-stop failure of node pj is a transient fault that results in
the removal of (pi, pj) from the network and pj from Nc(i), for every pi ∈ Nc(j). Naturally, node
addition is combined with a number of new link additions that include the new node.
Other than the above faults, we also consider any violation of the assumptions according to
which the system is assumed to operate (as long as the code stays intact). We refer to them as
(rare) transient faults. They can model, for example, the event in which more than κ links fail
concurrently. A transient fault can also corrupt the state of the nodes or the messages in the
communication channels.
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Frequency
Duration Rare Not rare
Any violation of the assumptions according Packet failures: omissions,
to which the system is assumed to duplications, reordering
operate (as long as the code stays intact). (assuming communication
Transient This can result in any state corruption. fairness holds).
Link failures (assuming
at most κ links failures).
Permanent Node and link failures.
Legal execution (LE)Recovery periodPrior to the system start, consider all faults
All states are legitimate 
Consider only non-transient faults Consider only benign faults 
Execution’s starting state
Figure 3: The table above details our fault model and the chart illustrates when each fault set is relevant. The
chart’s gray boxes represent the system execution, and the white boxes specify the failures considered to be possible
at different execution parts and recovery guarantees of the proposed self-stabilizing algorithm. The set of benign
faults includes both transient link failures as well as permanent link and node failures.
3.4.3 Benign vs. transient faults
We define the set of benign faults to include any fault that is not both rare and transient. The
correctness proof of the proposed algorithm demonstrates the system’s ability to recover after the
occurrence of either benign or transient faults, which are not necessarily rare. Our experiments,
however, consider all benign faults and no rare transient faults due to the computation limitations
that exist when considering all possible ways to corrupt the system state (Section 6.1).
3.5 Self-Stabilization
We define the system’s task by a set of executions called legal executions (LE) in which the task’s
requirements hold. That is, each controller pi constructs a κ-fault-resilient flow to every node
pj ∈ P (either a switch or a controller). We say that a system state c is legitimate, when every
execution R that starts from c is in LE. A system is self-stabilizing [20] with relation to task
LE, when every (unbounded) system execution reaches a legitimate state with relation to LE (cf.
Figure 3). The criteria of self-stabilization in the presence of faults [20, Section 6.4] requires the
system to recover within a bounded period after the occurrence of a single benign failure during
legal executions (in addition to the design criteria of self-stabilization that requires recovery within
a bounded time after the occurrence of the last transient fault). We demonstrate self-stabilization
in Section 5.4 and self-stabilization in the presence of faults in Section 5.5.
Self-stabilizing systems require the use of bounded memory, because real-world systems have
only access to bounded memory. Moreover, the number of messages sent during an execution
does not have an immediate relevance in the context of self-stabilization. The reason is that self-
stabilizing algorithms can never terminate and stop sending messages, because if they did it would
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not be possible for the system to recover from transient faults (cf. [20, Chapter 2.3]). That is,
suppose that the algorithm includes a predicate, such that when the predicate is true the algorithm
forever stops sending messages. Then, a single transient fault can cause this predicate to be true
in the starting state of an execution, from which the system can never recover. The latter holds,
because the algorithm will never send any message and yet in the starting system state any variable
that is not considered by the predicate can be corrupted.
3.5.1 Execution fairness
We say that a system execution is fair when every step that is applicable infinitely often is executed
infinitely often and fair communication is kept (both at the link and the transport layer). Note
that only failing nodes ever stop taking steps and thus a violation of the fairness (communication
or execution) assumptions implies the presence of transient faults, which we assume to happen only
before the starting system state of any execution.
3.5.2 Asynchronous frames
The first (asynchronous) frame in a fair execution R is the shortest prefix R′ of R = R′ ◦R′′, such
that each controller starts and ends at least one complete iteration (with round-trips) during R′
(see Section 3.3.2), where ◦ denotes an operation that concatenates two executions. The second
frame in execution R is the first frame in execution R′′, and so on.
3.5.3 Complexity measures
The stabilization time (or recovery period from transient faults) of a self-stabilizing system is the
number of asynchronous frames it takes a fair execution to reach a legitimate system state when
starting from an arbitrary one. The recovery period from benign faults is also measured by the
number of asynchronous frames it takes the system return to a legal execution after the occurrence
of a single benign failure.
We also consider the design criterion of memory adaptiveness by Anagnostou et al. [4]. This
criterion requires that, after the recovery period, the use of memory by each node is a function of the
actual network dimensions. In our system, a memory adaptive algorithm has space requirements
that depend on nC , which is the actual number controllers rather than their upper bound, NC .
Moreover, when considering a non-adaptive solutions, one can achieve a shorter recovery period
from transient faults (Section 8).
For the sake a simple presentation, our theoretical analysis assumes that all local computations
are done within a negligible time that is independent of, for example, the number of messages sent
and received during each frame. We do however consider all network dimensions that are related to
the recovery costs (including the number of messages sent and received during each frame) during
the evaluation of the proposed prototype (Section 6).
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Algorithm 1: Self-stabilizing SDN, high-level code description for controller pi. Algorithm 2 is
a detailed version of this algorithm.
1 Local state: replyDB ⊆ {m(j) : pj ∈ P} has the most recently received query replies;
2 currTag and prevTag are pi’s current and previous synchronization round, respectively;
3 Interface: myRules(G, j, tag): returns the rules of pi on switch pj given a topology G on round tag;
4 do forever begin
5 Remove from replyDB any reply from unreachable (in terms of graph connectivity) senders or not from
round prevTag or currTag. Also, remove from replyDB any response from pi and then add a record
that includes the directly connected neighbors, Nc(i);
6 if replyDB includes a reply (with tag currTag) from every node that is reachable (it terms of graph
connectivity) according to the accumulated local topology, G, in replyDB then
7 Store currTag’s value in prevTag and get a new and unique tag for currTag. By that, pi starts a
new synchronization round;
8 foreach switch pj ∈ PS and pj’s most recently received reply do
9 if this is the start of a new synchronization round then
10 Remove from pj ’s configuration any manager pk or rule of pk that was not discovered to be
reachable during round prevTag;
11 Add pi in pj ’s managers (if it is not already included) and replace pi’s rules in pj with
myRules(G, j, currTag);
12 foreach pj ∈ P that is reachable from pi according to the most recently received replies in replyDB do
send to pj (with tag currTag) an update message (if pj ∈ PS is a switch) and query pj ’s configuration;
13 upon query reply m from pj begin
14 if there is no space in replyDB for storing m then perform a C-reset by including in replyDB only the
direct neighborhood, Nc(i);
15 if m’s tag equals to currTag then include m in replyDB after removing the previous response from pj ;
16 upon arrival of a query (with a syncTag) from pj begin
17 send to pj a response that includes the local topology, Nc(i), and syncTag
4 Renaissance: A Self-Stabilizing SDN Control Plane
We present a self-stabilizing SDN control plane, called Renaissance, that enables each controller to
discover the network, remove any stale information in the configuration of the discovered unmanaged
switches (e.g., rules of failed controllers), and construct a κ-fault-resilient flow to any other node
(switch or controller) that it discovers in the network. For the sake of presentation clarity, we start
with a high-level description of the proposed solution in Algorithm 1 before we present the solution
details in Algorithm 2.
4.1 High-level description of the proposed algorithm
Algorithm 1 creates an iterative process of topology discovery that, first, lets each controller identify
the set of nodes that it is directly connected to; from there, it finds the nodes that are directly
connected to them; and so on. This network discovery process is combined with another process for
bootstrapping communication between any controller and any node in the network, i.e., connecting
each controller to its direct neighbors, and then to their direct neighbors, and so on, until it is
connected to the entire reachable network.
14
Each controller associates independently each iteration with a unique tag [3, 43, 44] that syn-
chronizes a round in which the controller performs configuration updates and queries. Controller pi
also maintains the variables currTag and prevTag (line 2) of the round synchronization procedure,
which starts when pi queries all reachable nodes and ends when it receives replies from all of these
nodes (cf. lines 6–7, as well as, Section 3). Upon receiving a query response, pi runs lines 13–15
and replies to other controllers’ queries in lines 16–17.
A controller pi ∈ PC keeps a local state of query replies (cf. Section 2.1) from other nodes
(line 1). These replies allow pi to accumulate information about the network topology according to
which the switch configurations are updated in each round. The following three basic functionalities
of Algorithm 1 are provided by the do-forever loop in lines 4–12, which we detail below.
4.1.1 Establishing communication between any controller and any other node
A controller pi ∈ PC can communicate and manage a switch pj ∈ PS only after pi has installed
rules at all the switches on a path between pi and pj . This, of course, depends on whether there
are no permanent link failures on the path. In order to discover these link failures, we use local
mechanisms for failure detection at each node for querying about the status of every link (cf.
Section 2.2.1). These mechanisms consider any permanent link failure as a transient fault and we
assume that Algorithm 1 starts running only after the last occurrence of any transient fault (cf.
Figure 3). Thus, as soon as there is a flow installed between pi and pj and there are no permanent
failures on the primary path (Section 3), pi and pj can exchange messages that arrive eventually
since it only depends on the temporary availability of the link which supports the communication
fairness assumption (Section 3.3.1).
The above iterative process of network topology discovery and the process of rule installation
consider κ-fault-resilient flows (cf. Section 2.2.2 and myRules() function in Section 3). These flows
are computed through the interface myRules(G, j, tag) (line 3), where G is the input topology, pj
is the switch to store these rules, and tag is the tag of the synchronization round. Once the entire
network topology is discovered, Algorithm 1 guarantees the installation of a κ-fault-resilient flow
between pi and pj . Thus, once the system is in a legitimate state, the availability of κ-fault-resilient
flows implies that the system is resilient to the occurrence of at most κ temporary link failures (and
recoveries) and pi can communicate with any node in the network within a bounded time.
4.1.2 Discovering the network topology and dealing with unreachable nodes
Algorithm 1 lets the controllers connect to each other via κ-fault-resilient flows. Moreover, Al-
gorithm 1 can detect situations in which controller pk /∈ PC is not reachable from controller pi
(line 5). The reason is that pi is guaranteed to (i) discover the entire network eventually, and (ii)
communicate with any node in the network. This means that pi eventually gets a response from
every node in the network. Once that happens, the set of nodes that respond to pi equals to the
set of nodes that were discovered by pi (line 6) and thus pi can restart the process of discovering
the network (line 7).
The start of a new round (in which pi rediscovers the network) allows pi to also remove in-
formation at the switches that is related to any unreachable controller pk ∈ PC , only when it has
succeeded in discovering the network and bootstrapped communication. We note that, during new
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Command type Command Switch pj’s control module action
new round 〈‘newRound’, tmetaRule〉 updates current synchronization tag of the switch
update command
〈‘delMngr’, k〉 deletes pk from manager(j)
〈‘addMngr’, k〉 adds pk in manager(j)
〈‘delAllRules’, k〉 deletes all rules of pk
〈‘updateRules’, newRules〉 replaces all rules of pi with newRules
query command 〈‘query’, tquery〉 sends query response m(j) to pi
Figure 4: Abstract switch pj ’s control module interface, for each controller pi ∈ PC .
rounds (line 9), pi removes information related to pk from any switch pj (line 10); whether this
information is a rule or pk’s membership in pj ’s management set. This stale information clean-up
eventually brings the system to a legitimate state, as we will prove in Section 5.
Recall that we regard the long-term failure of links (or of more than κ links) as transient faults.
After the occurrence of the last transient fault, the network returns to fulfill our assumptions about
the topology Gc, i.e., Gc is (κ + 1)-edge connected. Then, Algorithm 1 brings the system back to
a legitimate state (Section 5). The do-forever loop of Algorithm 1 completes by sending rule and
manager updates to every switch that has a reply in replyDB, as well as querying every reachable
node, with the current synchronization round’s tag (lines 12–12).
4.2 Refining the model: variables, building blocks, and interfaces
After the provision of a high-level description of the proposed solution in Algorithm 1, we provide
the solution details in Algorithm 2, which requires more notation, interfaces, and building blocks.
Local Variables Each controller’s state includes replyDB (line 3), which is the set of the most
recent query replies, and the tags currTag and prevTag, which are pi’s current, and respectively,
previous synchronization round tags. Each response m(j) ∈ replyDB can arrive from either a
switch or another controller and it has the form 〈j,Nc(j),manager(j), rules(j)〉, for pj ∈ P . The
code denotes by Nc(j) the neighborhood of pj , by manager(j) ⊆ PC the controllers of pj , and by
rules(j) ⊆ {〈k, j, src, dest, prt, z, tag〉 : (pk, pj , pz, pdest ∈ P ) ∧ (psrc ∈ PC) ∧ prt ∈ {0, . . . , nprt} ∧
tag ∈ tagDomain} the rule set of pj . Throughout Algorithm 2 and for ease of presentation we
refer to the elements of responses and rules using the struct notation, which is used by the C
programming language. We refer to the fields of m = 〈ID,Nc,Mng, rules〉 stated above, by
m.ID = j, m.Nc = Nc(j), m.Mng = manager(j), and m.rules = rules(j). We assume that the
size of replyDB is bounded by maxReplies ≥ 2(NC +NS), hence the local state has bounded size
(the factor of 2 is due to responses from the rounds prevTag and currTag).
An internal building block: round synchronization An SDN controller accesses the abstract
switch in synchronized rounds. Each round has a unique tag that distinguishes the given round
from its predecessors. We assume access to a self-stabilizing algorithm that generates unique tags
of bounded size from a finite domain of tags, tagDomain. The algorithm provides a function called
nextTag() that, during a legal execution, returns a unique tag. That is, immediately before calling
nextTag() there is no tag anywhere in the system that has the returned value from that call. Given
two tags, t1 and t2, we require that t1 = t2 holds if, and only if, they have identical values. We
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Algorithm 2: Self-stabilizing SDN, code for controller pi: new notation draft.
1 Symbols and operators: ‘•’ stands for ‘any sequence of values’, () is the empty sequence, ◦ (binary) is the
sequence concatenation operator and © (unary) concatenates a set’s items in an arbitrary order.
2 Constants: Nc(i) ⊆ P , pi’s directly connected nodes; maxRules and maxManagers, maximum number of
rules and managers, respectively; maxReplies: maximum size of the set replyDB;
3 Local state: A controller’s local state is the set replyDB which stores the most recently received query
replies. A query reply m = 〈ID,Nc,Mng, rules〉 includes the respondent’s ID, m.ID ∈ P , its
communication neighborhood, m.Nc ⊆ P , its set of managers, m.Mng ⊆ PC , and its set of installed rules,
m.rules. A rule r = 〈cID, sID, src, dest, prt, fwd, tag〉 ∈ m.rules includes the switch’s ID, r.sID, the ID of
the controller which installed the rule, r.cID, the source and destination fields, r.src, and respectively,
r.dest, the rule’s priority, r.prt, the ID of the neighbor to which the packet should be forwarded, r.fwd, and
the rule’s tag, r.tag, where r.sID, r.fwd, r.dest ∈ P , r.cID, r.src ∈ PC , r.prt ∈ {0, . . . , nprt}, and
r.tag ∈ tagDomain. A command record x includes the switch’s ID, x.sID, and the command, x.cmd;
4 currTag and prevTag are pi’s current, and respectively, previous synchronization round tags;
5 Interfaces: Section 2.2.2, Figure 4, as well as the following:
6 myRules(G, j, tag): creates pi’s rules at switch pj according to G with tag tag (cf. Section 2.2.2);
7 Macros: res(x) = {m ∈ replyDB : ∀r∈m.rules r.tag = x} ∪ {〈i,Nc(i), ∅, ∅〉};
8 G(S) := ({pk : ∃m∈S : (m.ID = k ∨ pk ∈ m.Nc)}, {(j, k) : ∃m∈S : (m.ID = j ∧ pk ∈ m.Nc});
9 fusion := res(currTag) ∪ {m ∈ res(prevTag) : @m′∈res(currTag)m′.ID = m.ID};
10 pj →G pk := true if there is a path from pj to pk in G;
11 do forever begin
/* Remove replies from unreachable senders or not from round prevTag or currTag. */
12 replyDB ← {m ∈ replyDB : m.ID = k 6= i ∧ (∃x∈{currTag,prevTag}m ∈ res(x) ∧ pi →G(res(x))
pk} ∪ {〈i,Nc(i), ∅, ∅〉};
13 let (newRound,msg) := (false, ∅); /* newRound and msg get their default values */
/* a new round with a new tag; remove replies with tag currTag */
14 if ∀p`∈G(res(currTag)) (pi →G(res(currTag)) p` =⇒ ∃m∈res(currTag) m.ID = `) then
15 (newRound, prevTag)← (true, currTag); currTag ← nextTag();
16 replyDB ← replyDB \ res(currTag);
/* The reference tag, referTag, is currTag when a topology change is discovered */
17 if G(fusion) = G(res(prevTag)) then let referTag := prevTag else let referTag := currTag;
18 foreach pj ∈ PS : ∃m∈res(referTag) m.ID = j do /* manage switch pj’s managers and rules */
/* pi is switch pj’s manager; remove unreachable managers on new rounds and nodes with
no rules */
19 let M := {pk ∈ m.Mng : (∃r∈m.rules r.cID = k) ∧ (¬newRound ∨ pi →G(res(prevTag)) pk)} ∪ {pi};
20 msg ← msg ∪ {(pj , 〈‘delMngr’, k〉) : pk ∈ (m.Mng \M)} ∪ {(pj , 〈‘addMngr’, i〉)};
/* Remove any pj’s rule that is associated with an unreachable node, pk */
21 msg ← msg ∪ {(pj , 〈‘delAllRules’, k〉) : (∃r∈m.rules r.cID = k) ∧ pk /∈M};
/* pi refreshes all of its rules at switch pj according to referTag */
22 msg ← msg ∪ {(pj , 〈‘updateRules’,myRules(G(res(referTag)), j, currTag)〉)};
/* Send the prepared messages to all reachable nodes in an aggregated form */
23 foreach pj : pi →G(fusion) pj do
24 send (〈‘newRound’, currTag〉) ◦©{x.cmd : x ∈ msg ∧ x.sID = j} ◦ (〈‘query’, currTag〉) to pj ;
25 upon query reply m from pj begin
/* pi tests that there is room to store m and m’s tag matches currTag */
26 if |replyDB ∪ {m}| > maxReplies then replyDB ← {〈i,Nc(i), ∅, ∅〉}; /* C-reset */
27 if (∃r∈m.rulesr.tag = currTag) then replyDB ← (replyDB \ {m′ ∈ replyDB : m′.ID = m.ID}) ∪ {m};
28 upon arrival of (• ◦ (〈‘query’, tag〉)) from pj do send 〈i,Nc(i),⊥, {〈j, i,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥, tag〉}〉 to pj ;
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use these tags for synchronizing the rounds in which the controllers perform configuration updates
and queries. Namely, in the beginning of a round, controller pi ∈ PC generates a new tag and
stores that tag in the variable currTag ← nextTag(). Controller pi then attempts to install at
every reachable switch pj ∈ PS a special meta-rule 〈i, j,⊥,⊥, nprt,⊥, tmetaRule〉, which includes, in
addition to pi’s identity, the tag tmetaRule = currTag and has the lowest priority (before making
any configuration update on that switch). It then sends a query to all (possibly) reachable nodes in
the network and combines that query with the tag tquery = currTag. The response to that query
from other controllers pj ∈ PC includes the query tag, tquery. The response to the query from the
switch pk ∈ PS includes the tag tmetaRule of the most recently installed meta-rule that pk has in its
configuration. The controller pi ends its current round once it has received a response from every
(possibly) reachable node in the network and that response has the tag of currTag.
We note the existence of self-stabilizing algorithms, such as the one by Alon et al. [3], that in fair
executions (that are legal with respect to the self-stabilizing end-to-end communication protocol)
provide unique tags within a number of synchronization rounds that is bounded (by a constant
whenever the execution is legal with respect to the self-stabilizing end-to-end communication pro-
tocol). We refer to that known bound by ∆synch and note that during a legal execution of the
round synchronization algorithm, it holds that controller pi receives only a response message m
that matches currTag, i.e., it discards any message with a different tag. Moreover, since during
legal executions nextTag() returns only unique tags, m and its acknowledgment are guaranteed to
form a complete round-trip. Note that we do not require nextTag() to support concurrent calls
since every controller manages its own synchronization rounds; one round at a time. We note the
existence of other relevant synchronizers, such as the α-synchronizer by Awerbuch et el. [6, 20],
which have simpler tags than [3]. However, we prefer the elegant interface defined in [3].
Interfaces Controller pi can send requests or queries to any other node pj (which could be either
another controller or a switch). We detail the switch interface below and illustrate it in Figure 4.
The controllers send command batches, which are sequences of commands. The special meta-
data command 〈‘newRound’, tmetaRule〉 is always the first command and updates the special meta-
rule to store tmetaRule. We use it for starting a new round (where tmetaRule = t is the round’s tag).
This starting command could be followed by a number of commands, such as 〈‘delMngr’, k〉 for
the removal of controller pk from the management of switch pj , 〈‘addMngr’, k〉 for the addition
of controller pk from the management of switch pj , and 〈‘delAllRules’, k〉 for the deletion of all of
pk’s rules from the configuration of switch pj , where pk ∈ PC \ {pi}. The rules’ update is done via
〈‘updateRule’, newRules〉 and it is the second last command. This update replaces all of pi’s rules
at switch pj (except for the special meta-rule) with the rules in newRules. These commands are to
be followed by the round’s query 〈‘query’, tquery〉, where tquery = t is the query’s tag. The switch
pj replies to a query by sending m = 〈j,Nc(j), manager(j), rules(j)〉 to pi, such that the rule
set includes also the special meta-rule 〈i, •, t〉 ∈ rules(j). Whenever pj ∈ PC is another controller,
response to a query is simply 〈i,Nc(i),⊥, {〈j, i,⊥,⊥,⊥,⊥, tquery〉}〉 (line 28). Note that controller
pj simply ignores all other types of commands. We use the interface function myRules(G, j, tag)
(Section 2.2.2) for creating the packet forwarding rules that controller pi installs at switch pj when
pi’s current view on the network topology is G in round tag (line 6).
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4.3 Algorithm details
Algorithm 2 presents the proposed solution with a greater degree of details than Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 is centered around a do forever loop, which starts by removing stale information from
replyDB (line 12). This removal action includes refreshing information related to controller pi,
which deletes information about any node that is not reachable from pi. The reachability test uses
the currently known information about the network topology, G and the relation→G (line 10) that
tells whether node pj is reachable from controller pi in G, given the information in replyDB.
Algorithm 2 accesses the switch configurations in synchronization rounds. Lines 13–16 manage
the start (and end) of synchronization rounds. When a new round starts, i.e., the condition of the
if-statement of line 14 holds, controller pi marks the start of a new round (newRoundi = true),
updates the values of the tags prevTagi and currTagi and clears any record with tag currTag of
the replies stored in replyDBi (line 15 and 16).
Algorithm 2 refreshes (and reconstructs) the information about remote nodes (controllers and
switches including the ones that are directly attached to it) by sending queries (line 24) and updating
the set of stored replies (line 27). Notice that controller pi also responds to query requests coming
from other controllers (line 28). Algorithm 2 uses these replies for completing the information
about the switches that are directly connected to a remote controller (and thus the other fields in
the response messages are the empty sets).
The heart of Algorithm 2 includes the updates of every switch pj ∈ PS (line 18 to 21). For
every switch pj (line 18), controller pi considers pj ’s stored response 〈j,Ngbi,Mngi, Ruli〉 for which
it prepares a set of commands to be stored in the set msgi (lines 13, 20, 21, 22 and 24). To that
end, pi first calculates the set of managers that pj should have in the following manner. If this
iteration of the do forever loop (lines 11 to 24) is the first one for the round currTagi, the value of
newRoundi is true (line 15); this leads pi to remove any controller pk that is not reachable according
to G(res(prevTag)) (lines 19 to 21). Whenever the iteration is not the first one, pi merely asserts
that it is a manager of pj .
Controller pi removes any rules of an unreachable controller pk (line 21) and updates all of its
rules at switch pj (line 22) using the interface function myRules() (line 22) and the reference tag,
referTag (line 8 and line 17). The proposed algorithm selects referTag ’s value to be prevTag during
legal executions. During recovery periods, the discovered topology can differ from that one that
is stored with the tag prevTag. In that case, the algorithm selects currTag as the reference tag.
After preparing these commands to all the switches, controller pi prepares query commands to all
reachable nodes (including both controllers and switches) and then sends all prepared commands to
their designated destinations. Note that each of these configuration updates are done via a single
message that aggregates all commands for a given destination (line 24).
We note that when a query response arrives at pi, before the update of the response set (line 27),
pi checks that there is sufficient storage space for the arriving response (line 26). If space is lacking,
pi performs what we call a ‘C-reset’. Note that pi stores replies only for the current synchronization
round, currTag.
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5 Correctness Proof
We prove the correctness of Algorithm 2 by showing that when the system starts in an arbitrary
state, it reaches a legitimate state (Definition 1) within a bounded period of ((∆comm + ∆synch) +
2)D+1)[((∆comm+∆synch)D+1) ·NS+NC+1] frames (Theorem 2). Moreover, we show that when
starting from a legitimate state, the system satisfies the task requirements and it is also resilient
to a bounded number of failures (lemmas 7 and 8).
We refer to the values of variable X at node pi (controller or switch) as Xi, i.e., the variable
name with a subscript that indicates the node index. Similarly, we refer to the return values of
function f at controller pk as fk.
Definition 1 (Legitimate System State). State c ∈ R is legitimate with respect to Algorithm 2
when, for every controller pi ∈ PC and node pk ∈ P \ {pi}, the following conditions hold.
1. 〈k, Nc(k), manager(k), rules(k)〉 ∈ replyDBi if, and only if, Nc(k), manager(k), and
rules(k) are pk’s neighborhood, managers, and respectively, set of packet forwarding rules
(line 3) as well as pi →G pk (line 10). Moreover, for the case of controller pk ∈ PC , the task
does not require pk to have any managers or rules, i.e., manager(k) = ∅ and rules(k) = ∅.
2. Any controller is the manager of every switch and only these controllers can be the mangers
of any switch, i.e., pi ∈ PC ∧ pk ∈ PS ⇐⇒ pi ∈ manager(k).
3. The rules installed in the switches encode κ-fault-resilient flows between controller pi and node
pk in the network Gc (Section 2.2.2).
4. The end-to-end protocol (Section 3.1) as well as the round synchronization protocol (Sec-
tion 2.2.1) between pi and pk are in a legitimate state.
5.1 Overview
The proof of Theorem 2 starts by establishing bounds on the number of rules that each switch needs
to store (Lemma 1). The proof arguments are based on the bounded network size and the memory
management scheme of the abstract switch (Section 2.1.1), which guarantees that, during a legal
execution, all non-failing controllers are able to store their rules (Lemma 1). The bounded network
size also helps to bound, during a legal execution, the amount of memory that each controller needs
to have (Lemma 2). This proof also bounds the number of C-resets that a controller might take
(line 26) during the period in which the system recovers from transient faults. This is line 14 in
Algorithm 1. Note that this bound on the number of C-resets is important because C-resets delete
all the information that a controller has about the network state.
C-resets are not the only disturbing actions that might occur during the recovery period. The
system cannot reach a legitimate state before it removes stale information from the configuration
of every switch. Note that failing controllers cannot remove stale information that is associated
with them and therefore non-failing controllers have to remove this information for them. Due to
transient faults, it could be the case that one controller can remove information that is associated
with another non-failing controller. We refer to these ‘mistakes’ as illegitimate deletion of rules or
managers (Section 5.3). Note that illegitimate deletions occur when the (stale) information that a
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controller has about the network topology differ from the actual network topology, Gc. Moreover,
due to stale information in the communication channels, any given controller might aggregate
(possibly stale) information about the network more than once and thus instruct more than once
the switch to delete illegitimately the rules of other controllers.
Theorem 1 bounds the number of these illegitimate deletions. It does so by counting the number
of possible steps in which a controller might have stale information about the network and that
stale information leads the controller to perform an illegal deletion. The proof arguments start by
considering a starting state in which controller pi ∈ Pc is just about to take a step that instructs the
switches to perform illegitimate deletions. The proof then argues that between any two such steps,
controller pi has to aggregate information about the network in such a way that pi preserves its
information about the network topology to be complete. But, this can only happen after receiving
a reply from every node in the preserved topology (Claim 5.1). By induction on the distance k
between controller pi ∈ Pc and node pj ∈ P \ {pi}, the proof shows that the information that pi
has about pj is correct within k · (∆comm + ∆synch + 1) + 1 times in which pi instruct the switches
to perform an illegitimate deletion, because there is a bounded number of stale information in
the communication channel between pi and pj (Lemma 4). Thus, the total number of illegitimate
deletions is at most D · (∆comm + ∆synch + 1) + 1.
The proof demonstrates recovery from transient faults by considering a period in which there
are no C-resets and no illegitimate deletions (Section 5.4). In such a period, all the controllers
construct κ-fault-resilient flows to any other node in the network (Lemma 5). This part of the
proof is again by induction on the distance k between controller pi ∈ Pc and node pj ∈ P \ {pi}.
The induction shows that, within ((∆comm + ∆synch) + 2)k frames, pi discovers correctly its k-
distance neighborhood and establishes a communication channel between pi and pj . This means
that within ((∆comm + ∆synch) + 2)D frames in which there are no C-resets and no illegitimate
deletions, the system reaches a legitimate state (Lemma 6).
The above allows Theorem 2 to show that within ((∆comm + ∆synch) + 2)D + 1)[((∆comm +
∆synch)D + 1) · NS + NC + 1] frames in R, there is a period of ((∆comm + ∆synch) + 2)D + 1)
frames in which there are no C-resets and no illegitimate deletions and thus the system reaches
a legitimate state. Lemma 7 shows that, when starting from a legitimate state an then letting a
single link in the network to be added or remove from Gc, the system recovers within O(D) frames.
The arguments here consider that number of frames it takes for each controller to notice the change
and to update all the switches. By similar arguments, Lemma 8 shows that after the addition or
removal of at most NC − 1 controllers, the system reaches a legitimate system state within O(D)
frames.
5.2 Analysis of memory and message size requirements
Lemmas 1 and 2 bound the needed memory at every node during a legal execution. Recall that we
assume that the switches implement a mechanism for dealing with clogged memory (Section 2.1.1),
such that once controller pi ∈ PC refreshes its rules on a given switch, that switch never removes
pi’s rules.
Lemma 1 considers an event that can delay recovery, i.e., the removal of a rule at a switch due
to lack of space. Lemma 1 bounds the needed memory for every switch, and thus relates to events
that can delay recovery, i.e., the removal of a rule at a switch due to lack of space.
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Lemma 1 (Bounded Switch Memory). (i) Suppose that R is a legal execution of Algorithm 2. A
switch needs to let no more than maxManagers ≥ NC controllers to manage it and (2) no more
than maxRules ≥ NC · (NC +NS − 1) · nprt packet forwarding rules.
Proof. Let pj ∈ PS be a switch.
Number of managers. Recall that we assume that maxManagers ≥ NC ≥ |PC |, i.e., the bound
is large enough to store all managers (once all stale information is removed in a FIFO manner that
is explained in Section 2.1.1). During a legal execution R of Algorithm 2, every controller accesses
every switch repeatedly (line 24). This way, every pi ∈ PC , is always among the NC most recently
installed controllers at pj ∈ PS .
Number of rules. Recall that a rule is a tuple of the form 〈k, i, src, dest, prt, j, tag〉, where
pk ∈ PC is the controller that created this rule, pi ∈ PS is the switch that stores this rule, psrc ∈ PC
and pdest ∈ P are the source, and respectively, the destination of the packet, prt is the packet’s
priority, pj ∈ P is the relay node (i.e., the rule’s action field) and tag is the synchronization round
tag.
To show that there are no more than NC · (NC +NS−1) ·nprt rules that a switch needs to store,
recall that each of the NC controllers psrc ∈ PC constructs κ-fault-resilient flows to every node
pdest ∈ P \ {psrc} in the network. Thus, switch pi ∈ PS might be a hop on the κ-fault-resilient flow
between psrc and pdest. That is, there are at most NC · (NC +NS − 1) such flows that pass via pi,
because for each of the NC possible flow sources psrc, there are exactly (NC +NS − 1) destinations
pdest. Each such flow stores at most nprt ≥ κ+ 1 rules at pi, i.e., one for each priority. Note that,
during a legal execution, each switch pi ∈ PS stores at most one tag per psrc ∈ PC (line 24).
Lemma 2 considers an event C-reset, which can delay recovery.
Lemma 2 (Bounded Controller Memory). (1) Let ax ∈ R be the first step in which controller
pi runs lines 25–27 (upon query reply). For every state in R that follows step ax, node pi stores
no more than maxReplies replies in the set replyDBi. (2) Suppose that R is a legal execution.
Controller pi ∈ PC needs to store, in the set replyDBi, no more than maxReplies ≥ 2 · (NC +NS)
items. (3) Suppose that R is any execution, which may start in an arbitrary state. Controller pi
performs a C-reset at most once in R, i.e., takes a step ax′ ∈ R that includes the execution of
line 26, in which the if-statement condition is true.
Proof. Part (1). We note that pi modifies replyDBi only in line 12 and line 16 in the do-forever
loop (lines 11–24), and in lines 26 and 27 in the query reply procedure (lines 25–27). In line 12
and line 16, the size of replyDBi either decreases (possible only at the first step that pi executes
line 12 or line 16) or stays the same. Thus, the rest of this proof focuses only at lines 26 and 27,
where the set replyDBi increases due to the addition of an incoming reply (line 27).
Let ax′ be the first step in R, in which controller pi executes lines 25–27 due to a message mj that
pi receives from node pj . By line 26, if |replyDBi ∪ {mj}| > maxReplies holds, then pi performs
a C-reset, i.e., sets replyDBi ← {〈i,Nc(i), ∅, ∅〉}, which implies that |replyDBi| = 1 after the
execution of line 26. Hence, after the execution of line 27 in step ax′ , |replyDBi| < maxReplies
holds for the state cx′+1, which follows ax′ immediately. Similarly, since the size of replyDBi
increases only when pi executes line 27, for every step ax′′ and the system state cx′′+1 that appears
in R after cx′+1, it is true that |replyDBi| ≤ maxReplies holds in cx′′+1, due to line 26. Thus, for
every system state that follows the first step ax′ ∈ R, it holds that |replyDBi| ≤ maxReplies.
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Part (2). Line 12 removes from replyDBi any response that its synchronization round tag
is not in the set {prevTagi, currTagi} and line 27 does not add to replyDBi a response that its
synchronization round tag is not currTagi. Moreover, line 16 makes sure that when finishing one
synchronization round and then transitioning to the next one, replyDBi includes replies only with
synchronization round tags that are prevTagi. Therefore, there are no more than two synchroniza-
tion round tags that could be simultaneously present in replyDBi. Moreover, line 12 also removes
any response from an unreachable node, because item 1 of Definition 1 holds in any system state of
a legal execution. This further limits the set replyDBi to includes response from at most NC +NS
nodes. Therefore, |replyDBi| ≤ 2 · (NC +NS).
Part (3). Suppose that pi does perform a C-reset during R. Once that happens, parts (i) and
(ii) of this proof imply that this can never happen again.
Lemma 3 demonstrates that the proposed algorithm requires bounded message size.
Lemma 3. The message size before and after the recovery period is in O(maxRules logN), and
respectively, O(∆N logN) bits, where N = NC +NS and ∆ is the maximum node degree.
Proof. The size of the messages sent differs during and after the recovery period. Algorithm 2
involves messages sent from a controller to any other node and their subsequent replies to the
controller. A message from a controller to a switch is a set of commands msg initialized to the
empty set in line 13. Commands are appended in msg in lines 20, 21, and 22, before a controller
appends two more commands to msg (line 24) and sends it to a switch. We denote with msg20,
msg21, msg22 the sets of commands appended to msg in the respective lines. Thus, |msg| =
|msg20| + |msg21| + |msg22| + O(log ctag) bits, where |msgx| refers to the message size due to line
x and ctag, is the maximum size of a tag. Note that when using tags based on the ones in [3],
O(log(N)) bits are needed, whereas using the ones by Awerbuch et el. [6, 20] requires O(1) bits.
We now calculate the size of each msgx, for each line x mentioned above, following the
analysis of the current section. Recall from Section 2.1 that the size of a single rule is in
O(logNC + logNS + log nprt + log ctag) bits, where nprt ≥ ∆ + 1 suffices for expressing all rules.
A command in msg20, msg21, and msg22 has size in O(logNC + logNS), O(logNC + logNS),
and respectively, in O((NC + NS − 1)nprt(logNC + logNS + log nprt + log ctag)) bits. Dur-
ing recovery the following hold for the product of cardinality with command size for each set:
|msg20| ∈ O(maxManagers · (logNC + logNS)), |msg21| ∈ O(maxRules · (logNC + logNS)),
|msg22| ∈ O((NC + NS − 1)nprt(logNC + logNS + log nprt + log ctag))). Similarly, during a
legal execution the following hold: |msg20| ∈ O(logNC + logNS)), |msg21| = 0 |msg22| ∈
O((NC + NS − 1)nprt(logNC + logNS + log nprt + log ctag))). Summing up, during recovery
|msg| ∈ O((maxRules+maxManagers)(logNC + logNS) + (NC +NS − 1)nprt(logNC + logNS +
log nprt + log ctag))) and during a legal execution |msg| ∈ O((logNC + logNS) + (NC + NS −
1)nprt(logNC + logNS + log nprt + log ctag))).
We now turn to calculate the message size for a query response. Since the query response of
a switch has a larger size than the one of a controller (by definition), we present only the case of
switches. During recovery, a switch query response has size in O(logNS + ∆(logNS + logNC) +
maxManagers logNC+maxRules(logNC+logNS+log nprt+log ctag)) bits, while a legal execution
the response size is in O(logNS + ∆(logNS + logNC) +NC logNC + (NC +NS − 1)nprt(logNC +
logNS + log nprt + log ctag)) bits, where ∆ is the maximum degree.
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The proof of Lemma 3 reveals that the proposed solution is communication adaptive [26],
because after stabilization the messages size is reduced.
5.3 Bounding the Number of Illegitimate Deletions
We consider another kind of event that might delay recovery (Definition 2) and prove that it
can occur a bounded number of times. Recall that ∆comm is the number of frames in which the
end-to-end protocol stabilizes (Section 3.1) and ∆synch the number of frames in which the round
synchronization mechanism stabilizes (Section 4.2).
Definition 2 (Illegitimate deletions). A switch pj performs an illegitimate deletion when it removes
a non-failing controller p` ∈ PC from its manager set (or its rules), due to a command that it
received from another controller pk ∈ PC .
Theorem 1 (Bounded number of illegitimate deletions). Let axk ∈ R be the k-th step in which
controller pi ∈ PC executes lines 15–16 during execution R. Suppose that R includes at least
((∆comm + ∆synch)D + 1) such axk steps, where D is the network diameter. Let R
′ be a prefix
of R = R′ ◦ R′′ that includes the steps a1, . . . , ax(∆comm+∆synch)D+1 ∈ R′ and R′′ be the matching
suffix. Controller pi does not take steps as′k ∈ R′′ that send a message mk to pj ∈ PS, such that pj
performs an illegitimate deletion (Definition 2) upon receiving mk.
Proof. This proof uses Claim 5.1 and Lemma 4. Theorem 1 follows by the case of k ≥ D for
Lemma 4 and then applying Part (ii) of Claim 5.1.
Claim 5.1. (i) The condition in the if-statement of line 14 holds if, and only if, Vreported =
Vreporting, where Vreported = {pk : ∃〈j,Nc(j),•,rls〉∈replyDBi ((k = j∨pk ∈ Nc(j))∧∃〈i, jk, •, currTagi〉 ∈
rls)} ∪ {〈i,Nc(i), ∅, ∅〉} and Vreporting = {pj : 〈j, •, rls〉 ∈ replyDBi ∧ (∃〈i, jk, •, currTagi〉 ∈ rls)}.
(ii) Suppose that every node pj in Gc has sent a response 〈j, •〉 to pi. Suppose that pi stores these
replies in replyDBi together with pi’s report about its directly connected neighborhood, 〈i,Nc(i), ∅, ∅〉,
cf. lines 7 and 12. In this case, the condition in the if-statement of line 14 holds.
Proof of Claim 5.1. The proof of Part (i). The condition in the if-statement of line 14 is
(∀p`: pi →G(resi(currTagi)) p` =⇒ 〈`, •〉 ∈ resi(currTagi). When Vreported = Vreporting holds, the
following two claims also hold by the definition of these sets (and vice versa): (a) pi’s response is
in replyDBi, and (b) for every node pj that was queried with tag currTagi, such that before the
query either pj had a response in replyDBi or a direct neighbor of pj had a response in replyDBi,
there exists a response from pj in replyDBi with rules that have the tag currTagi. Hence, the
condition in the if-statement of line 14 is true.
The proof of Part (ii). This is just a particular case in which P = Vreported = Vreporting.
Lemma 4. Let pjk ∈ P be a node that is at distance k from pi in Gc, such that pj0 , pj1 , . . . , pjk is
any shortest path from pi to pjk and pj0 = pi. Let cxy ∈ R be the system state that immediately
follows step axy ∈ {ax1 , . . ., axk·(∆comm+∆synch)+1} ⊂ R′.
1. Let ` > k ·∆comm + 1. The system state cx` is legal with respect to the end-to-end protocol of
the channel between pi and pjk , and it holds that m = 〈jk, •〉 is a message arriving from pjk
through the channel to pi, which is an acknowledgment for pi’s message to pjk .
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2. Let ` > k · (∆comm + ∆synch) + 1. The system state cx` is legal with respect to the round syn-
chronization protocol between pi and pjk . That is, for any message m = 〈jk, •, rls〉 that arrives
from the channel from pjk to pi, it holds that m ∈ replyDBi ∧ ∃r∈rls r = 〈i, jk, •, currTagi〉.
Moreover, message m is an acknowledgement of a message m′ that pi has sent to pjk and
together m′ and m form a completed round-trip.
Proof of Lemma 4. We note that the first step, ax1 could occur due to the fact that the system
starts in an arbitrary state in which the condition of the if-statement of line 14 holds, hence the
addition of 1 in k · (∆comm + ∆synch). The proof is by induction on k > 0. That is, we consider the
steps in axy ∈ {ax1 , . . . , axk·(∆comm+∆synch)+1}.
The base case of k = 1. Claim 5.1 says that the condition in the if-statement of line 14 holds
if, and only if, Vreported = Vreporting, where {〈i,Nc(i), ∅, ∅〉} ⊆ Vreported (line 7). Therefore, for any
` > 1, we have that ax` ∈ {ax2 , . . . , axk·(∆comm+∆synch+1)+1} implies that {〈i,Nc(i), ∅, ∅〉} ⊆ Vreporting
holds immediately before ax` .
Claim 5.2. Between axk−1 and axk , a message 〈jk, •, rls〉 : ∃r∈rls r = 〈i, jk, •, currTagi〉 arrives
from the channel from pjk ∈ Nc(i) to pi, which pi stores in replyDBi, where k ≥ 1.
Proof of Claim 5.2. During the step axk−1 , controller pi removes any response 〈jk, •, rls〉 : ∃r∈rls r =
〈i, jk, •, currTagi〉 (line 16) and the only way in which 〈jk, •, rls〉 : ∃r∈rls r = 〈i, jk, •, currTagi〉
holds immediately before axk is the following. Between axk−1 and axk , a message arrives through
the channel from pjk ∈ Nc(jk−1) : j0 = i to pi, which pi stores in replyDBi (line 27). This is
true because no other line in the code that accesses replyDBi adds that message to replyDBi (cf.
lines 12, 16, and 27).
The proof of Part (1). It can be the case the pi sends a message for which it receives a (false)
acknowledgement from pj1 , i.e., without having that message go through a complete round-trip.
However, by ∆comm’s definition (Section 3.1), that can occur at most ∆comm times.
The proof of Part (2). It can be the case that pi receives message m from pj1 for which the
following condition does not hold in cj1 : m = 〈•, rls〉 ∈ replyDBi ∧ ∃r∈rls r = 〈i, jk, •, currTagi〉.
However, by ∆synch’s definition (Section 2.2.2), that can occur at most ∆synch times. The rest of
the proof is implied by the properties of the round synchronization algorithm (Section 2.2.2).
The induction step. Suppose that, within more than (∆commk+1) and ((∆comm+∆synch)k+1)
synchronization rounds from R’s starting state, the system reaches a state in which conditions
(1), and respectively, (2) hold with respect to some k ≥ 1. We show that in cx∆comm(k+1)+1 and
cx(∆comm+∆synch)(k+1)+1
, conditions (1), and respectively, (2) hold with respect to k + 1.
The proof of Part (1). Claim 5.1 says that the condition in the if-statement of line 14
holds if, and only if, Vreported = Vreporting. By the induction hypothesis, condition (2) holds
with respect to k in cx(∆comm+∆synch)k+1
and therefore A(k + 1) ∪ {〈i,Nc(i), ∅, ∅〉} ⊆ Vreported,
where A(k) = {〈jk′ , Nc(jk′), •, rls〉 : 1 < k′ ≤ k ∧ ∃r∈rls r = 〈i, jk′ , •, currTagi〉}. There-
fore, that fact that the step ax(∆comm+∆synch)(k+1)+2
∈ ax2 . . . axk·(∆comm+∆synch+1)+1 implies that
A(k + 1) ∪ {〈i,Nc(i), ∅, ∅〉} ⊆ Vreporting holds in the system state that appears in R immediately
before the step ax(∆comm+∆synch)(k+1)+2
. Claim 5.2 implies the rest of the proof.
The proof of Part (2). The proof here follows by similar arguments to the ones that appear in
the proof of item (2) of the base case.
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Part (iii) of Lemma 2 and Theorem 1 imply Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. [[Any execution R of Algorithm 2 includes no more than NC C-resets (Lemma 2)
and ((∆comm + ∆synch)D + 1) ·NS illegitimate deletions (Theorem 1).]]
5.4 Recovery from transient faults
In this section we prove that Algorithm 2 is self-stabilizing. Lemma 5 shows that (under some
conditions, such as reset freedom) controller pi eventually discovers the local topology of a switch
pjk that is at distance k from pi in the graph Gc. This means that pi has all the information
that its needs for constructing (at least) a 0-fault-resilient flow to pjk and discover any switch
pjk+1 ∈ Nc(pjk) that is at distance k + 1 from pi. Then, Lemma 6 shows that, within a bounded
number of frames, no stale information exists in the system. Theorem 2 combines Corollary 1 and
Lemma 6 to show that, within a bounded number of frames, the system reaches a legitimate state
from which only a legal execution may continue.
We start by giving some necessary definitions. Let Gi be the value of G(referTagi) (line 17)
that controller pi ∈ PC computes in a step ax ∈ R. We say that there is a path between pi ∈ P
and pj ∈ P , when there exist pj0 , pj1 , . . . , pjk ∈ P , such that (1) pj0 = pi, (2) pjk = pj , (3)
pj1 , . . . , pjk−1 ∈ PS , and (4) the rules installed by a controller p` ∈ PC at the switches in pj1 , . . . , pjk−1
(and also pi or pj if they are also switches) forward packets from pi to pj as well as from pj to pi
(when the respective links are operational). We say that two nodes pi ∈ P and pj ∈ P can exchange
packets, when there is a path between pi and pj . Moreover, we say that the rules installed in the
switches ps ∈ PS facilitate κ-fault-resilient flows between pi and pj , if at the event of at most κ link
failures there exists a path between pi and pj . Let px and py be two nodes in P and recall that we
assume that every node pz ∈ P has a fixed ordering of its neighbors, i.e., Nc(z) = {pi1 , . . . , pi|Nc(z)|}.
We define the first shortest path between px and py to be the shortest path between px and py that
includes the nodes with minimum indices according to the neighborhood orderings (among all the
shortest paths between these two nodes).
Lemma 5. Let pi ∈ PC be a controller and pjk ∈ P be a node in P that is at distance k from
pi in Gc, such that pj0 , pj1 , . . . , pjk is the first shortest path from pi to pjk and pj0 = pi in Gc.
Suppose that C-resets (Lemma 2) and illegitimate deletions (Theorem 1) do not occur in R. For
every k ≥ 0, and any system state that follows the first ((∆comm + ∆synch) + 2)k frames from the
beginning of R, the following hold.
1. 〈jk, Nc(jk),manageri(jk), rulesi(jk)〉 ∈ resi(prevTagi), where Nc(jk), manageri(jk), and
rulesi(jk) are pjk ’s neighborhood, managers, and respectively, rules that pi has received from
pjk . Moreover, for the case of controller pjk ∈ PC , it holds that manager(jk) = ∅ and
rules(jk) = ∅.
2. pi ∈ managerjk(jk).
3. the rules in rulesj0(j0), rulesj1(j1), . . . , rulesjk(jk) facilitate packet exchange between pi and
pjk along pj0 , pj1 , . . . , pjk (when the respective links are operational).
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4. The end-to-end protocol as well as the round synchronization protocol between pi and pjk are
in a legitimate state.
Proof. The proof is by induction on k.
The base case. Claims 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 imply that the lemma statement holds for k = 1.
Claim 5.3. Within one frame from R’s beginning, the system reaches a state in which condition
(1) is fulfilled with respect to pi and any node that is in pi’s distance-1 neighbors in Gc.
Proof of Claim 5.3. During the first frame (with round-trips) of R, controller pi starts and com-
pletes at least one iteration in which it sends a query (line 24) to every node pj1 ∈ P that is in pi’s
distance-1 neighborhood in Gc (this includes both switches, as we explain in Section 2.1.1, as well
as other controllers, which respond according to line 28). Moreover, during that first frame, pj1
receives that query and replies to pi (lines 25-27) within one step (Section 3.2). Thus, the first part
of condition (1) is fulfilled, because controller pi then adds (or updates) the latest (query) replies
that it received from these neighbors to replyDBi. The second part of condition (1) is implied by
the first part of condition (1) and by line 28.
Claim 5.4. Within two frames from the beginning of R, the system reaches a state in which
conditions (2) and (3) are fulfilled with respect to pi and any node that is in pi’s distance-1 neighbors
in Gc.
Proof of Claim 5.4. This proof uses Claim 5.3 to prove this claim by first showing that within one
frame from the beginning an execution in which condition (1) holds, the system reaches a state in
which conditions (2) and (3) are fulfilled with respect to pi and any node pj ∈ Nc(i). This indeed
implies that conditions (2) and (3) are fulfilled within two frames of R for pi’s direct neighbors.
Let R∗ be a suffix of R such that in R∗’s stating system state, it holds that condition (1) is
fulfilled with respect to pi and any node that is in pi’s distance-1 neighbors in Gc. During the
first frame (with round-trips) of R∗, controller pi starts and completes at least one iteration (with
round-trips) in which it is able to include pi in pj ’s manager set, managerj(j) (line 19 to 21) and
to install rules at pj ∈ Nc(i) (line 22). We know that this installation is possible, because pi is a
direct neighbor of pj ∈ Nc(i) (Section 2.1.1). Once these rules are installed, the packet exchange
between pi and pj ∈ Nc(i) is feasible. This implies that conditions (2) and (3) are fulfilled within
one frame of R∗ (and two frames of R) for pi’s direct neighbors.
Claim 5.5. Within ((∆comm + ∆synch) + 2) frames from the beginning of R, the system reaches
a state in which condition (4) is fulfilled with respect to pi and any node that is in pi’s distance-1
neighbors in Gc.
Proof of Claim 5.5. Since conditions (2) and (3) hold within two frames with respect to k = 1,
controller pi and pj1 can maintain an end-to-end communication channel between them because the
network part between pi and pj1 includes all the needed flows. By ∆comm’s definition (Section 3.1),
within ∆comm frames, the system reaches a legitimate state with respect to the end-to-end protocol
between pi and pj1 . Similarly, by ∆synch’s definition (Section 2.2.2), within ∆synch frames, the
system reaches a legitimate state with respect to the round synchronization protocol between pi
and pj1 . Thus, condition (4) holds within ((∆comm + ∆synch) + 2) frames from R’s beginning.
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The induction step. Suppose that, within ((∆comm + ∆synch) + 2)k frames from R’s starting
state, the system reaches a state cx ∈ R in which conditions (1), (2), (3) and (4) hold with respect
to k. We show that within (∆comm + ∆synch) + 2 frames from cx, the system reaches a state in
which the lemma’s statements hold with respect to k + 1 as well.
Showing that, within one frame from cx, processor pi knows all of its distance-(k + 1)
neighbors. This part of the proof starts by showing that within one frame from cx, execution R
reaches a state, such that pi →Gi pj holds for every distance-(k+1) neighbor of pi in Gc. The system
state cx encodes (packet forwarding) rules that allow pi to exchange packets with its distance-k
neighbors in Gc (since by the induction hypothesis, conditions (3) and (4) hold with respect to k
in cx). Moreover, pi stores in res(prevTagi) replies from pi’s distance-k neighbors in Gc (since by
the induction hypothesis, condition (1) holds for k in cx). The latter implies that pi knows, as part
of Gi in cx, all of its distance-(k+ 1) neighbors, {pk : ∃〈j,Nc(j), •〉 ∈ resi(prevTagi)∧ (k = j ∨ k ∈
Nc(j, prevTagi))}, since every reply of a distance-k neighbor, pj∗ , in Gc (which resi(prevTagi)
stores in cx) includes pj∗ ’s neighborhood.
Condition (1) holds with respect to k+1 within ((∆comm+∆synch)+2)k+1 frames. Using
the above we show that, within one frame from cx, controller pi ∈ PC queries all of its distance-(k+1)
neighbors (line 24), receives their replies, and stores them in replyDBi (lines 25–27), i.e., 〈jk+1,
Nc(jk+1),manageri(jk+1), rulesi(jk+1)〉 ∈ resi(currTagi) for every distance-(k+ 1) neighbor pjk+1
of pi in Gi. Recall that cx encodes rules that let pi to forward packets with its distance-k neighbors
in Gc (condition (3) holds for k in cx). By the query-by-neighbor functionality (Section 2.1.1),
every such distance-k neighbor reports on its direct neighbors (that include pi’s distance-(k + 1)
neighbors), which implies that it forwards the query message to pi’s distance-(k + 1) neighbor as
well as the reply back to pi. Therefore, within ((∆comm + ∆synch) + 2)k + 1 frames, the system
reaches a state, cx′ , in which condition (1) holds with respect to k + 1.
Conditions (2) to (3) hold with respect to k + 1 within ((∆comm + ∆synch) + 2)k + 2
frames. The next step of the proof is to show that within one frame from cx′ , the system reaches
the state cx′′ in which conditions (2) and (3) hold with respect to k+ 1 (in addition to the fact that
condition (1) holds). By the functionality for querying (and modifying)-by-neighbor (Section 2.1.1)
and for every switch pj that is a distance-(k + 1) neighbor of pi in Gc, it holds that between cx′
and cx′′ : (a) pi adds itself to the manager set manager(j) of pj (line 19 to 21), and (b) pi installs
its rules in pj ’s configuration (line 22). (We note that for the case pj is another controller, there is
no need to show that conditions (2) and (3) hold.)
Condition (4) holds for k+ 1 within ((∆comm + ∆synch) + 2)(k+ 1) frames. The proof is by
similar arguments to the ones that appear in the proof of Claim 5.5.
Thus, conditions (1), (2), (3), and (4) hold for k+1 within ((∆comm+∆synch)+2)(k+1) frames
in R and the proof is complete.
Lemma 6 bounds the number of frames before the system reaches a legitimate system state.
Lemma 6. Let R = R′ ◦R′′ be an execution of Algorithm 2 that includes a prefix, R′, of (∆comm +
∆synch)+2)D+1 frames that has no occurrence of C-resets or illegitimate deletions. (1) Any system
state in R′′ is legitimate (Definition 1). (2) Let ax ∈ R′′ be a step that includes the execution of
the do-forever loop that starts in line 12 and ends in line 24. During that step ax, the value of
msgi, which pi sends to pj ∈ P in line 24, does not include the record 〈‘delMngr’, •〉 nor the record
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〈‘delAllRules’, •〉, i.e., no deletions, whether they are illegitimate or not, of managers or rules. (3)
No controller pi takes a step in R
′′ during which the condition of line 26 holds, which implies that
pi performs no C-reset during R
′′.
Proof. When comparing the conditions of Definition 1 and the conditions of Lemma 5, we see
that Lemma 5 guarantees that within (∆comm + ∆synch) + 2)D frames the system reaches a state
calmostSafe ∈ R′ in which all the conditions of Definition 1 hold except condition 2 with respect
to controllers pj /∈ PC that do not exist in the system (and their rules that are stored by the
switches). From condition 1 of Definition 1, we have that at each controller pi ∈ PC , it holds
that G(res(currTagi)) = G(fusioni) = Gc. This implies that pi can identify correctly any stale
information related to pj and remove it from configuration of every switch (see line 18 to 22) that is
in the system during the round that follows calmostSafe, which takes one frame because condition 1
of Definition 1 holds. This means that within (∆comm+∆synch)+2)D+1 frames the system reaches
a legitimate state in which all the conditions of Definition 1 hold and thus R′′ is a legal execution,
i.e., the first part of the lemma holds. Part (2) of this lemma is implied by the fact that there is
no controller pj /∈ PC that the controller pi ∈ PC needs to remove from the configuration of any
switch during the legal execution R′′. Part (3) is implied by Part (3) of Lemma 2 and the fact that
R′′ is a legal execution.
Theorem 2 (Self-Stabilization). Within ((∆comm + ∆synch) + 2)D+ 1)[((∆comm +∆synch)D+ 1) ·
NS + NC + 1] frames in R, the system reaches a state csafe ∈ R that is legitimate (Definition 1).
Moreover, no execution that starts from csafe ∈ R includes a C-reset nor illegitimate deletion of
managers or rules.
Proof. In this proof, we say that an execution Radm is admissible when it includes at least ((∆comm+
∆synch) + 2)D + 1 frames and no C-reset nor an illegitimate deletion. Let R be an execution of
Algorithm 2. Let us consider R’s longest possible prefix R′, such that R′ does not include any
sub-execution that is admissible, i.e., R = R′ ◦R′′. Recall that by Corollary 1 the prefix R′ has no
more than ((∆comm+ ∆synch)D+ 1) ·NS +NC C-resets or illegitimate deletions. By the pigeonhole
principle, the prefix R′ has no more than ((∆comm + ∆synch) + 2)D + 1)[((∆comm + ∆synch)D +
1) ·NS +NC + 1] frames. By Lemma 6, R′′ does not include C-resets nor deletions of managers or
rules, and the system has reached a safe state, which is csafe.
5.5 Returning to a legitimate state after topology changes
This part of the proof considers executions in which the system starts in a state c′, that is obtained
by taking a system state csafe that satisfies the requirements for a legitimate system state (Defini-
tion 1), and then applying a bounded number of failures and recoveries. We discuss the conditions
under which no packet loss occurs when starting from c′, which is obtained from csafe and (i) the
events of up to r link failures and up to ` link additions (Lemma 7), as well as, (ii) the events of
up to r controller failures and up to ` controller additions (Lemma 8).
Lemma 7. Suppose that c′ is obtained from a legitimate system state csafe by the removal of at
most r links and the addition of at most ` links (and no further failures), and R is an execution of
Algorithm 2 that starts in c′. It holds that no packet loss occurs in R as long as r ≤ κ and ` ≥ 0.
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For the case of r ≤ κ ∧ ` ≥ 0 recovery occurs within O(D) frames, while for the case of r > κ
bounded communication delays can no longer be guaranteed.
Proof. We consider the following cases.
The case of r ≤ κ and ` = 0. Suppose that a single link e has failed, i.e., it has been
permanently removed from Gc, in a state c
′ that follows a legitimate system state csafe. Say that e
is included either in a primary path Π0 in Go(0) or in one of the alternative paths of Π0, Πk in Go(k),
where k > 0, for a controller pi (cf. definitions of the function myRules() and the graphs Go(k) in
Section 2.2.2). For every such case, since e’s failure occurs after a legitimate state, communication
is maintained when at most κ − 1 links (other than e) are non-operational. Let s be the index in
{0, 1, . . . , κ} for which e ∈ Πs. Due to the construction of the paths Πk, k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , κ}, in the
computation of the function myRules() in pi, if s = 0, then each alternative path Πk before e’s
failure is now considered as path Πk−1, for k ∈ {1, . . . , κ}. Otherwise, if s 6= 0, the paths Πk remain
the same for k ∈ {0, . . . , s−1} and each path Πk is now considered as the alternative path Πk−1 for
k ∈ {s+ 1, . . . , κ}. In both cases, a new path Πκ is computed and installed in the switches if that
is possible due to the edge-connectivity of Gc, and if that is not the case, the rules installed in the
network’s switches facilitate (κ − 1)-fault-resilient flows between every controller and every other
node in the network. The recovery time is at most 1 frame (if e belongs to some path Πk), since
the removal of link e occurs after a legitimate state and all nodes in the network can be reached by
every controller pi ∈ PC .
Note that if e is not part of any flow, then its failure has no effect in maintaining bounded
communication delays. By extension of the argument above, bounded communication delays can
be maintained when at most κ link failures occur. That is, in the worst case when exactly κ
link failures occur, bounded communication delays are maintained due to the existence of the κth
alternative paths and the assumption that no further failures occur in the network.
The case of r = 0 ∧ ` > 0. A link addition can violate the first shortest path optimality, thus
in this case all paths should be constructed from scratch. Since, the link addition occurs after a
legitimate state, no stale information exist in the system, and no resets or illegitimate deletions
occur. Hence, by Lemma 5 (for k = D) within 2D frames it is possible to (re-)build the κ-fault
containing flows throughout all nodes in the network and reach a legitimate system state (since the
edge-connectivity cannot decrease with link additions).
The case of r ≤ κ and ` > 0. Note that by the first case, bounded communication delays
are maintained, since r ≤ κ. Since ` links are added in Gc, the controllers require O(D) frames to
install new paths (by Lemma 5), even though the connectivity of Gc might be less than κ+ 1 (but
for sure at least 1). Hence, bounded communication delays are guaranteed in this case, given that
no more failures occur.
The case of r > κ. In this case, we do not guarantee bounded communication delays. This
holds, due to the fact that the removal of more than κ edges might break connectivity in Gc, which
makes the existence of alternative paths for r > κ link failures impossible.
Lemma 8. Suppose that c′ is obtained from a legitimate system state csafe by the removal of at
most r nodes and the addition of at most ` nodes (and no further failures), and R is an execution
of Algorithm 2 that starts in c′. It holds that no packet loss occurs in R if, and only if, Gc remains
connected (and NC ≥ 1 ∧NS ≥ 1), and in this case the network recovers within O(D) frames. For
the case of r > 0 ∧ ` = 0 bounded communication delays can no longer be guaranteed.
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Proof. We study the following cases.
The case of r > 0 and ` = 0. The removal of a switch pj is equivalent to the removal of all the
links that are adjacent to pj . Since the edge-connectivity is at least κ+ 1, the minimum degree of
every node in Gc is at least κ+ 1. Thus, a switch removal (equiv. removal of at least κ+ 1 links)
would violate the assumption of at most κ link failures, possibly violating connectivity or affecting
all the alternative paths between two endpoints in the network. In this case, Algorithm 2 can only
guarantee that the controllers will install κ˜-fault-resilient flows, where 0 ≤ κ˜ ≤ κ.
The case of removing a controller pi can be handled by Algorithm 2 if we assume that the
communication graph Gc stays (at least) (κ + 1)-edge-connected after removing pi. In that case,
each controller pi′ can discover the removal of pi and delete it from replyDBi′ in 1 frame, and then,
in the subsequent frame, pi′ can delete pi’s rules from rulesj(j) and pi from managerj(j), for every
switch pj . Hence, within 2 frames the system recovers to a legitimate state, since the existing rules
of the other controllers stay intact.
The case of r = 0 and ` > 0. We assume that if controller or switch additions occur (including
their adjacent links) after a legitimate state, the new node is initialized with empty memory. That
is, replyDBi is empty if a new controller pi is added, and managerj(j) = rulesj(j) = ∅ if a
new switch pj is added. Note that the new node should not violate the assumption of Gc’s edge-
connectivity being at least κ + 1. In both cases, and similarly to link additions, the first shortest
path optimality might be violated and hence (as in the case of link additions) a period of 2D frames
is needed (Lemma 5) to (re-)build the κ-fault-resilient flows (since no stale information exist, and
no resets or illegal deletions occur).
The case of r > 0 and ` > 0. Let G′c be Gc after the removal of at most r nodes and the addition
of at most ` nodes. If G′c is κ˜-edge-connected, where 1 < κ˜ ≤ κ, then bounded communication
delays in the occurrence of at most κ˜ link failures can be guaranteed by following the arguments
of Section 5.4 for κ = κ˜.
6 Evaluation
In order to evaluate our approach, and in particular, to complement our theoretical worst-case anal-
ysis as well as study the performance in different settings, we implemented a prototype using Open
vSwitch (OVS) and Floodlight. To ensure reproducibility and to facilitate research on improved
and alternative algorithms, the source code and evaluation data are accessible via [52]. In the fol-
lowing, we first explain our expectations with respect to the performance (Section 6.1) and discuss
details related to the implementation of the proposed solution (Section 6.2) before presenting the
setup of our experiments (Section 6.3). In particular, we empirically evaluate the time to bootstrap
an SDN (after the occurrence of different kinds of transient failures), the recovery time (after the
occurrence of different kinds of benign failures), as well as the throughput during a recovery period
that follows a single link failure (Section 6.4). For the reproducibility sake, the source code and
evaluation data can be access via [52].
6.1 Limitations and expectations
We study Renaissance’s ability to recover from failures in a wide range of topologies and settings.
We note that the scope of our work does not include an empirical demonstration of recovery after
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Figure 5: Bootstrap time for the networks using 3 controllers. The network diameters are 4, 5, 8,
10 and 11 (left to right order).
the occurrence of arbitrary transient faults, because such a result would need to consider all possible
starting system states. Nevertheless, we do consider recovery after changes in the topology, which
Section 3.4 models as transient faults. However, in these cases, we mostly consider a single change
to the topology, i.e., node or link failure (after the recovery from any other transient fault).
The basis for our performance expectation is the analysis presented in Section 5. Specifically, we
use lemmas 5, 7 and 8 to anticipate an O(D) bootstrap time and recovery period after the occurrence
of benign failures. Recall that, for the sake of simple presentation, our theoretical analysis does not
consider the number of messages sent and received (Section 3.5.3), which depends on the number
of nodes in the case of Renaissance. Thus, we do not expect the asymptotic bounds of lemmas 5, 7
and 8 to offer an exact prediction of the system performance since our aim in Section 5 is merely
to demonstrate bounded recovery time. The measurements presented in this section show that
Renaissance’s performance is in the ballpark of the estimation presented in Section 5.
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Network Name Number of Nodes Network Diameter
B4 12 5
Clos 20 4
Telstra 57 8
AT&T 172 10
EBONE 208 11
Table 1: The number of nodes and diameter of the studied networks
6.2 Implementation
In this evaluation section, we demonstrate Renaissance’s ability to recover from failures without
distinguishing between transient and permanent faults, as our model does (Figure 3), because there
is no definitive distinction between transient and permanent faults in real-world systems. Moreover,
our implementation uses a variation on Algorithm 2. The reason that we need this variation is that
this evaluation section considers changes to the network topology during legal executions, whereas
our model considers such changes as transient faults that can occur before the system starts running.
In detail, Algorithm 2 installs rules on the switches using two tags, which are currTag and
prevTag (line 4). That is, as the new rules for currTag are being installed, the ones for prevTag
are being removed. Our variation uses a third tag, beforePrevTag , which tags the rules in the
synchronization round that preceded the one that prevTag refers to. When Renaissance installs
new rules that are tagged with currTag, it does not remove the rules tagged with prevTag but
instead, it removes the rules that are tagged with beforePrevTag . This one extra round in which
the switches hold on to the rules installed for prevTag’s synchronization round allows Renaissance
to use the κ-fault-resilient flows that are associated with prevTag for dealing with link failures
(without having them removed, as Algorithm 2 does). The above variation allows us to observe the
beneficial and complementary existence of the mechanisms for tolerating transient and permanent
link failures, i.e., Renaissance’s construction of κ-fault-resilient flows, and respectively, update of
such flows according to changes reported by Renaissance’s topology discovery.
6.3 Setup
We consider a spectrum of different topologies (varying in size and diameter), including B4 (Google’s
inter-datacenter WAN based on SDN), Clos datacenter networks and Rocketfuel networks (namely
Telstra, AT&T and EBONE). The relevant statistics of these networks can be found in Table 1. The
hosts for traffic and round-trip time (RTT) evaluation are placed such that the distance between
them is as large as the network diameter. The evaluation was conducted on a PC running Ubuntu
16.04 LTS OS, with the Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-457OS CPU @ 2.9 GHz (4x CPU) processor and
32 GB RAM. During the experiments in large networks, the rule sets need to accommodate many
rules that controllers and switches have to exchange. Therefore, the maximum transfer unit (MTU)
of each link is set to the value of 65536 bytes in all experiments.
Paths are computed according to Breadth First Search (BFS) and we use OpenFlow fast-failover
groups for backup paths. We introduce a delay before every repetition of the algorithm’s do forever
loop as well as between each interval in which the abstract switch discovers its neighborhood. In
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Figure 6: Bootstrap time for Telstra (T), AT&T (A) and EBONE (E) for 1 to 7 controllers.
our experiments, the default delay value was 500 ms. However, in an experiment related to the
bootstrap time (Figure 7), we have varied the delay values.
The link status detector (for switches and controllers) has a parameter called Θ, similar to the
one used in [8, Section 6]. This threshold parameter refers to scenarios in which the abstract switch
queries a non-failing neighboring node without receiving a query reply while receiving Θ replies
from all other neighbors. The parameter Θ can balance a trade-off between the certainty that node
is indeed failing and the time it takes to detect a failure, which affects the recovery time. We have
selected Θ to be 10 for B4 and Clos, and 30 for Telstra, AT&T and Ebone. We observed that when
using these settings the discovery of the entire network topology always occurred and yet had the
ability to provide a rapid fault detection.
6.4 Results
We structure our evaluation of Renaissance around the main questions related to the SDN boot-
strap, recovery times, and overhead, as well as regarding the throughput during failures.
For illustrating our data in figures 5–6 and 8–13, we use violin plots [28]. In these plots, we
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Figure 7: Bootstrap time for B4, Clos, Telstra, AT&T and EBONE using seven controllers, as a
function of query intervals. Recall that the task delay in the added time between any repetition of
the algorithm’s do forever loop as well as each interval in which the abstract switch discovers its
neighborhood.
indicate the median with a white dot. The first and third quartiles are the endpoints of a thick black
line (hence the white dot representing the median is a point on the black line). The thick black line
is extended with thin black lines to denote the two extrema of all the data (as the whiskers of box
plots). Finally, the vertical boundary of each surface denotes the kernel density estimation (same
on both sides) and the horizontal boundary only closes the surface. We ran each experiment 20
times. For the case of violin plots, we used all measurements except the two extrema. For the case
of the other plots, we dismissed from the 20 measurements the two extrema. Then, we calculated
average values and used them in the plots.
6.4.1 How efficiently Renaissance bootstraps an SDN?
We first study how fast we can establish a stable network starting from empty switch configurations.
Towards this end, we measure how long it takes until all controllers in the network reach a legitimate
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Figure 8: Communication cost per node needed from a maximum loaded global controller to reach
a stable network. Note that we divide the number of messages by the number of iterations it takes
to converge.
state in which each controller can communicate with any other node in the network (by installing
packet-forwarding rules on the switches). For the smaller networks (B4 [29] and Clos [2]), we use
three controllers, and for the Rocketfuel networks [51, 50] (Telstra, AT&T and EBONE), we use
up to seven controllers.
Bootstrapping time. We are indeed able to bootstrap in any of the configurations studied
in our experiments. Lemma 5 predicts an O(D) bootstrap time when starting from an all empty
switch configuration; that prediction does not consider the number of nodes, as explained above.
Note that in such executions, no controller sends commands that perform (illegitimate) deletions
before it discovers the entire network topology and thus no illegitimate deletion is ever performed
by any controller. In terms of performance, we observe that the recovery time grows (Figure 5) as
the network dimensions increase (diameter and number of nodes). It also somewhat depends on
the number of controllers when experimented with the larger networks (Figure 6): more controllers
result in slightly longer bootstrap times. We note that the recovery process over a growing number
of controllers follows trades that appear when considering the maximum value over a growing
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Figure 9: Recovery time after fail-stop failure for a controller.
number of random variables. Specifically, when an abstract switch updates its rules, the time it
takes to update all of the rules that were sent by many controllers can appear as a brief bottleneck.
Note that the shown bootstrap times only provide qualitative insights: they are, up to a certain
point, proportional to the frequency at which controllers request configurations and install flows
(Figure 7). Specifically, the rightmost peaks in the charts are due to the congestion caused by
having task delays that overwhelm the networks. These peaks rise earlier for networks with an
increasing number of switches. This is not a surprise because the proposed algorithm establishes
more and longer flows in larger networks and thus use higher values of network traffic as the number
of nodes becomes larger.
Communication overhead. The study of bootstrap time thus raises interesting questions
regarding the communication overhead during the network bootstrap period. Concretely, we mea-
sure the maximum number of controller messages, taking three controllers for the smaller networks
B4 and Clos, and seven controllers for the Rocketfuel networks Telstra, AT&T and EBONE in
these experiments. While the communication overhead naturally depends on the network size, Fig-
ure 8 suggests that when normalized, i.e., dividing by the number of iterations it takes to recover,
the overhead is similar for different networks (and slightly higher for the case of the two largest
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Figure 10: Recovery time after fail-stop failure of 1-6 controllers in Telstra (T), AT&T (A) and
EBONE (E).
networks).
6.4.2 How efficiently Renaissance recovers from link and node failures?
In order to study the recovery from benign failures, we distinguish between their different types:
(i) fail-stop failures of controllers, (ii) permanent switch-failures, and (iii) permanent link-failures.
The experiments start from a legitimate system state, to which we inject the above failures.
(i) Recovery after the occurrence of controller’s fail-stop failure.
We injected a fail-stop failure by disconnecting a single controller chosen uniformly at random
(Figure 9). We have also conducted an experiment in which we have disconnected many-but-not-
all controllers (Figure 10). That is, we disconnected a single controller that is initially chosen
at random and measured the recovery time. The procedure was repeated for the same controller
while recording the measurements until only one controller was left. Lemma 8, which does not take
into consideration the time it takes to send or receive messages, suggests that after the removal
of at most NC − 1 controllers, the system reaches a legitimate system state within O(D). We
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Figure 11: Recovery time after permanent switch-failure.
observe in Figure 9 results that are in the ballpark of that prediction. Moreover, we also measure
disconnecting one to six random controllers simultaneously for the Rocketfuel networks (Telstra,
AT&T, and EBONE), while running controller number 7. Note that we could not observe a relation
between the number of failing controllers and the recovery time, see Figure 10.
(ii) Recovery after the occurrence of switch’s fail-stop failure. We have experimented
with recovery after permanent switch-failures. These experiments started by allowing the network
to reach a legitimate (stale) state. Once in a legitimate (stale) state, a switch (selected uniformly at
random) was disconnected from the network. We have then measured the time it takes the system
to regain legitimacy (stability). We know that by Lemma 8, the recovery time here should be at
most in the order of the network diameter. Figure 11 presents the measurements that are in the
ballpark of that prediction. That is, the longest recovery time for each of the studied networks
grows as the network diameter does. We also observe a rather large variance in the recovery time,
especially for the larger networks. This is not a surprise since the selection of the disconnected
switch is random.
(iii) Recovery after the occurrence of permanent link-failures. During the experiments,
we waited until the system reached a legitimate state, and then disconnected a link and waited for
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Figure 12: Recovery time after permanent link-failure.
the system to recover. Lemma 8 predicts recovery within O(D). Figure 12 presents results that
are in the ballpark of that prediction. We also investigated the case of multiple and simultane-
ous permanent link failures that were selected randomly. Figure 13 suggests that the number of
simultaneous failures does not play a significant role with respect to the recovery time.
6.4.3 Performance during failure recovery
Besides connectivity, we are also interested in performance metrics such as throughput and message
loss during recovery period that occur after a single link failure. Recall that we model such failures as
transient faults and therefore there is a need to investigate empirically the system’s behavior during
such recovery periods since the mechanism for fault-resilient flows (Section 2.2.2) is always active.
Our experiments show that the combination between the proposed algorithm and the mechanism
for fault-resilient flows performs rather well. That is, the recovery period from a single permanent
link failure is brief and it has a limited impact on the throughput.
In the following, we measure the TCP throughput between two hosts (placed at a maximal
distance from each other), in the presence of a link-failure located as close to the middle of the
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Figure 13: Recovery time after multiple (2,4 or 6) permanent link-failures at random for B4 (B),
Clos (C), Telstra (T), AT&T (A) and EBONE (E).
primary path as possible. To generate traffic, we use Iperf. A specific link to fail is chosen, such
that it enables a backup path between the hosts.
The maximum link bandwidth is set to 1000 Mbits/s. During the experiments, we conduct
throughput measurements during a period of 30 seconds. The link-failure occurs after 10 seconds,
and we expect a throughput drop due to the traffic being rerouted to a backup path. We note that
our prototype utilizes packet tagging for consistent updates [42] using the variation of Algorithm 2
(presented in Section 6.2), which allows the controllers to repair the κ-fault-resilient flows without
the removal of the ones tagged with the previous tag.
We can see in Figure 14 that one throughput valley occurs indeed (to around 480 - 510 Mbits/s).
For comparison, Figure 15 shows the throughput over time without recovery that includes consistent
updates [42]: only the backup paths are used in these experiments, and no new primary paths are
calculated or used after the link-failure at the 10th second. The results in figures 14 and 15 are
very similar: there is a strong correlation between these two methods in terms of performance, see
Table 2.
In order to gain more insights, we used Wireshark [35] for investigating the number of re-
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Figure 14: Throughput for the different networks using network updates with tags. Here, a single
link failure causes the drop after the 10th second.
Network Correlation
Clos 0.94
B4 0.95
Telstra 0.92
EBONE 0.96
Exodus 0.94
Table 2: Correlation coefficient of the average throughput for the experiments in Figure 14 and
Figure 15.
transmissions (after the link-failure) for Telstra, AT&T and EBONE network topologies. We ob-
served an increase in the packets sent at the 11th second (after the link-failure) are re-transmissions
(Figure 16) and “BAD TCP” flags (Figure 17). This increase was from levels of below 1% to levels
of between 10% and 15% and it quickly deescalated. We have also observed a much smaller presence
of out-of-order packets (Figure 18). We observe that these phenomena (and the slight irregularity in
the throughput) are related to TCP congestion control protocol, which is TCP Reno [36]. Indeed,
42
Time (seconds)
Th
ro
ug
hp
ut
 (M
bit
s/s
)
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
400
425
450
475
500
525
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l l
l
l
l l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Network (Diameter)
EBONE (10)
AT&T (9)
Telstra (8)
Clos (5)
B4 (4)
Figure 15: Throughput for the different networks using no recovery after link-failure. This experi-
ment considers a single link failure causes the drop after the 10th second.
whenever congestion is suspected, Reno’s fast recovery mechanism divides the current congestion
window by half (when skipping the slow start mechanism).
7 Related Work
The design of distributed SDN control planes has been studied intensively in the last few years [7,
31, 19, 53, 27, 13, 48]; both for performance and robustness reasons. While we are not aware of any
existing solution for our problem (supporting an in-band and distributed network control), there
exists interesting work on bootstrapping connectivity in an OpenFlow network [49, 30] that does
not consider self-stabilization. In contrast to our paper, Sharma et al. [49] do not consider how to
support multiple controllers nor how to establish the control network. Moreover, their approach
relies on switch support for traditional STP and requires modifying DHCP on the switches. We do
consider multiple controllers and establish an in-band control network in a self-stabilizing manner.
Katiyar et al. [30] suggest bootstrapping a control plane of SDN networks, supporting multiple
controller associations and also non-SDN switches. However, the authors do not consider fault-
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Figure 16: Retransmission percentage rate for packets sent at each second.
tolerance. We provide a very strong notion of fault-tolerance, which is self-stabilization.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to present a comprehensive model and
rigorous approach to the design of in-band distributed control planes providing self-stabilizing
properties. As such, our approach complements much ongoing, often more applied, related research.
In particular, our control plane can be used together with and support distributed systems such
as ONOS [7], ONIX [31], ElastiCon [19], Beehive [53], Kandoo [27], STN [13] to name a few.
Our paper also provides missing links for the interesting work by Akella and Krishnamurthy [1],
whose switch-to-controller and controller-to-controller communication mechanisms rely on strong
primitives, such as consensus protocols, consistent snapshot and reliable flooding, which are not
currently available in OpenFlow switches.
We also note that our approach is not limited to a specific technology, but offers flexibilities
and can be configured with additional robustness mechanisms, such as warm backups, local fast
failover [41], or alternatives spanning trees [10, 37].
Our paper also contributes to the active discussion of which functionality can and should be
implemented in OpenFlow. DevoFlow [17] was one of the first works proposing a modification
of the OpenFlow model, namely to push responsibility for most flows to switches and adding
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Figure 17: Percentage of “BAD TCP” flags during the recovery period
that follows a single link failure
efficient statistics collection mechanisms. SmartSouth [45] shows that in recent OpenFlow versions,
interesting network functions (such as anycast or network traversals) can readily be implemented
in-band. More closely related to our paper, [46] shows that it is possible to implement atomic read-
modify-write operations on an OpenFlow switch, which can serve as a powerful synchronization
and coordination primitive also for distributed control planes; however, such an atomic operation
is not required in our system: a controller can claim a switch with a simple write operation. In
this paper, we presented a first discussion of how to implement a strong notion of fault-tolerance,
namely a self-stabilizing SDN [20, 18].
We are not the first to consider self-stabilization in the presence of faults that are not just
transient faults (see [20], Chapter 6 and references therein). Thus far, these self-stabilizing algo-
rithms consider networks in which all nodes can compute and communicate. In the context of
the studied problem, some nodes, i.e., the switches, can merely forward packets according to rules
that are decided by other nodes, i.e., the controllers. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
first to demonstrate a rigorous proof for the existence of self-stabilizing algorithms for an SDN
control plane. This proof uses a number of techniques, such as the one for assuring a bounded
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Figure 18: Percentage of out-of-order packets during the recovery period that follows a single link
failure
number of resets and illegitimate rule deletions, that were not used in the context of self-stabilizing
bootstrapping of communication (to the best of our knowledge).
Bibliographic note. We reported on preliminary insights on the design of in-band control planes
in two short papers on Medieval [46, 47]. However, Medieval is not self-stabilizing, because its
design depends on the presence of non-corrupted configuration data, e.g., related to the controllers’
IP addresses, which goes against the idea self-stabilization. A self-organizing version of Medieval
appeared in [15]. Renaissance provides a rigorous algorithm and proof of self-stabilization; it
appeared as an extended abstract [16] and as a technical report [14].
8 Discussion
While the benefits of the separation between control and data planes have been studied intensively
in the SDN literature, the important question of how to connect these planes has received less
attention. This paper presented a first model and an algorithm, as well as a detailed analysis and
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proof-of-concept implementation of a self-stabilizing SDN control plane called Renaissance.
8.1 A Θ(D) stabilization time variation (without memory adaptiveness)
Before concluding the paper, we would like to point out the existence of a straightforward Ω(D)
lower bound to the studied task to which we match an O(D) upper bound. Indeed, consider the
case of a single controller that needs to construct at least one flow to every switch in the network.
Starting from a system state in which no switch encodes any rule and the controller is unaware
of the network topology, an in-band bootstrapping of this network cannot be achieved within less
than O(D) frames, where D is the network diameter (even in the absence of any kind of failure).
We also present a variation of the proposed algorithm that provides no memory adaptiveness. In
this variation, no controller ever removes rules installed by another controller (line 21). This varia-
tion of the algorithm simply relies on the memory management mechanism of the abstract switches
(Section 2.1.1) to eventually remove stale rules (that were either installed by failing controllers or
appeared in the starting system state). Recall that, since the switches have sufficient memory to
store the rules of all controllers in PC , this mechanism never removes any rule of controller pi ∈ PC
after the first time that pi has refreshed its rules on that switch. Similarly, this variation of the
algorithm does not remove managers (line 19) nor performs C-resets (line 26). Instead, these sets
are implemented as constant size queues and similar memory management mechanisms eventually
remove stale set items. We note the existence of bounds for these queues that make sure that they
have sufficient memory to store the needed non-failing managers and replies, i.e., maxManagers,
and respectively, 3 ·maxRules.
Recall the conditions of Lemma 5 that assume no C-resets and illegitimate deletions to occur
during the system execution. It implies that the system reaches a legitimate state within ((∆comm+
∆synch)+2)D+1 frames from the beginning of the system execution. However, the cost of memory
use after stabilization can be NC/nC times higher than the proposed algorithm. We note that
Lemma 5’s bound is asymptotically the same as the recovery time from benign faults (lemmas 7
and 8). Theorem 2 brings an upper-bound for the proposed algorithm that is (((∆comm+∆synch)D+
1) ·NS +NC + 1) times larger than the one of the above variance with respect to the period that
it takes the system to reach a legitimate state. However, Theorem 2 considers arbitrary transient
faults, which are rare. Thus, the fact that the recovery time of the proposed memory adaptive
solution is longer is relevant only in the presence of these rare faults.
8.2 Possible extensions
We note that the proposed algorithm can serve as the basis for more even advanced solutions. In
particular, while we have deliberately focused on the more challenging in-band control scenario
only, we anticipate that our approach can also be used in networks which combine both in-band
and out-of-band control, e.g., depending on the network sub-regions. Another possible extension
can consider the use of a self-stabilizing reconfigurable replicated state machine [23, 24, 22] for
coordinating the actions of the different controllers, similar to ONOS [7].
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